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ABSTRACT
In 2009, Bitcoin created a world-first decentralized alternative
currency that has spawned over 1,700 imitations by private parties. In
2018, governments finally joined the race, as Venezuela issued a
world-first sovereign digital currency. Major economies like Canada,
China, Singapore and the United Kingdom are all developing their own
versions. These new versions differ significantly from Bitcoin and
among themselves, creating the potential to flood the global financial
system with a myriad of new digital currencies. Existing taxonomies of
currency struggle with the speed of change (frequently due to
inadequate understanding of the underlying technology) and, as a
result, remain incomplete and filled with confusing and conflicting
vocabulary (with terms like “virtual currencies,” “digital currencies,”
“cryptocurrencies” frequently being used to refer to the same thing).
This Article resolves this problem. First, it analyzes existing forms of
currency based on their functional characteristics and provides a
comprehensive taxonomy. Second, it integrates the likely forms of
upcoming sovereign digital currencies into this taxonomy and outlines
the corresponding challenges. At the moment, no major economy seems
keen to issue a sovereign digital currency, but if one does, others will,
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for good reasons, respond in kind and the ground will be laid for a
sovereign digital currency battle royale.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There are today over 2,000 new, privately held and controlled
digital currencies across the globe and the rush to create them shows
no sign of abating. 1 The first of its kind was Bitcoin, established in
2009. 2 This digital decentralized alternative to state-controlled
currency offered new opportunities for end-users, by providing
additional methods for transferring or storing value. In developing
countries, mobile money, issued and used on mobile phones, provided
another digital alternative, with the best known example being M-Pesa,
launched by Safaricom in Kenya in 2007. 3
These new products have created additional risks for national and
international payment systems and triggered a regulatory response.
Mobile money (also known as “electronic money” or “e-money”)
products have largely become regulated activities, although many
issues remain unresolved. 4 In the case of Bitcoin and its spin-offs,
regulation has proven distinctly problematic for technical reasons:
1. All Cryptocurrencies, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/
[https://perma.cc/WA4W-BJJT].
2. Bitcoin is the first digital currency issued without a single administrator or repository.
Its operation was described in SEC v. Shavers as follows: “Bitcoins are held at, and sent to and
from, bitcoin ‘addresses.’ A bitcoin ‘wallet’ is a software file that holds bitcoin addresses. Along
with each bitcoin address, a bitcoin wallet stores the ‘private key’ for the address, essentially a
password used by the holder to access the bitcoins held at the address, as well as the transaction
history associated with the address. Whoever has the private key for a bitcoin address controls
the bitcoins held at that address.” SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
130781, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014).
3. See ALLIANCE FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION, ENABLING MOBILE MONEY TRANSFER:
THE CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA’S TREATMENT OF M-PESA 12 (2010). For additional detail
concerning M-Pesa, see Nick Hughes & Susie Lonie, M-Pesa: Mobile Money for the
“Unbanked” Turning Cellphones into 24-Hour Tellers in Kenya, 2(1-2) INNOVATIONS: TECH.,
GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 63 (2007); Benjamin Ngugi, Matthew Pelowski, & Javier G.
Ogembo, M-pesa: A Case Study of the Critical Early Adopters’ Role in the Rapid Adoption of
Mobile Money Banking in Kenya, 43 ELECTRONIC J. INFO. SYS. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5
(2010); Mercy W. Buku & Michael W. Meredith, Safaricom and M-Pesa in Kenya: Financial
Inclusion and Financial Integrity, 8 WASH. J. L., TECH. & ARTS 375, 399 (2013); Isaac Mbiti &
David N. Weil, Mobile Banking: The Impact of M-Pesa in Kenya (National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper No. 17129, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17129.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Louise Malady, Cheng-Yun Tsang & Ross P. Buckley, Promoting Financial
Inclusion by Encouraging the Payment of Interest on E-Money, 40 U. NEW SOUTH WALES L. J.
1558 (2017); Katharine Kemp & Ross P. Buckley, Resolution Powers Over E-Money Providers,
40 U. NEW SOUTH WALES L. J. 1539, 1539-57 (2017); David Ramos, Javier Solana, Ross P.
Buckley & Jonathan Greenacre, Protecting Mobile Money Customer Funds in Civil Law
Jurisdictions, 65 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 705 (2016).
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without a central server or a single operator, it has been rather difficult
to identify those to whom regulation should apply (after all, rules apply
to people and businesses they create—not to technology, which lacks
self-awareness, at least this day and age). Instead, the most popular
regulatory measure has taken the form of warnings concerning
potential risks and—ironically—lack of proper regulation. 5
As the new privately issued digital currencies have kept
multiplying, it was perhaps only a matter of time before regulators
would devise new strategies where regulation had thus far proven
ineffective. Governments and central banks around the globe have
already started developing new sovereign digital currency models,
inspired by the Bitcoin example. 6 These projects are all in different
stages of development, and regulators are prone to hastening slowly
and testing the technology before applying it in practice. However, the
interest in creating an “official” alternative to Bitcoin and its numerous
copycats is clear and cannot be ignored.
The many national initiatives to develop new sovereign digital
currencies raise a whole range of issues. How will these new projects
impact the financial system, both domestically and internationally?
What are the opportunities and challenges faced by central banks and
governments in developing the new currency types? But perhaps the
first question should be different: how do these new currencies
5. See, e.g., Perkins Coie, Digital Currencies: International Actions and Regulations,
PERKINS COIE (June 2018), https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-insights/digital-currenciesinternational-actions-and-regulations.html [https://perma.cc/C677-GRR7].
6. See Morten Bech & Rodney Garratt, Central Bank Cryptocurrencies, BANK INT’L
SETTLEMENTS Q. REV. 55, 57 (2017); John Barrdear & Michael Kumhof, The Macroeconomics
of Central Bank Issued Digital Currencies, 3, 17 (Bank of England, Working Paper No. 605,
2016),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/working-paper/2016/themacroeconomics-of-central-bank-issued-digital-currencies.pdf?la=en&hash=
341B602838707E5D6FC26884588C912A721B1DC1 [https://perma.cc/4LFB-8HLX];; Walter
Engert & Ben Fung, Central Bank Digital Currency: Motivations and Implications, 2, 26 (Bank
of Canada, Staff Discussion Paper 2017-16, 2017), https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/sdp2017-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VC9-BJU6]; see also Ruth
Wandhöfer, The Future of Digital Retail Payments in Europe: A Role for Central Bank Issued
Crypto
Cash?,
EUR.
CENT.
BANK
(Oct.
2017),
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/conferences/shared/pdf/20171130_ECB_BdI_conference/paym
ents_conference_2017_academic_paper_wandhoefer.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPA6-YMJ5]; JP
Koning, Fedcoin: A Central Bank-issued Cryptocurrency, R3 REPORTS (Nov. 2016),
https://www.r3.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/fedcoin_central-bank_R3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VJ4W-FQ4L]; see generally GEORGE DANEZIS & SARAH MEIKLEJOHN,
CENTRALLY BANKED CRYPTOCURRENCIES (2016), https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/502.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E2YT-Z48X].
.
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compare to their existing counterparts, most of which are already
digital? 7
This Article sets the foundation for a comprehensive analysis of
existing initiatives to establish a new form of sovereign digital
currency. Its objective is to put these new projects into perspective,
taking a broader look at the existing payment systems and known
currency types. One difficulty with achieving the above goal is the lack
of a common taxonomy encompassing all existing forms of currencies.
Absence of agreed terminology (discussed in greater detail in the next
section) inhibits in-depth dialogue and analysis, leading some
regulators to acknowledge that “[w]ith the exception of a few articles
from respectable media sources or economics journals, it is almost
impossible to find any comprehensive papers on this issue.” 8
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows: Part II
outlines the key challenges resulting from the absence of a common
taxonomy of various currencies and explains the rationale behind the
proposed approach. Part III provides a brief historic outlook on the
concept of currency. Parts IV and V analyze the concept of currency in
the context of formal and alternative payment systems, respectively.
Part VI examines the emerging new approaches to sovereign digital
currency. Part VII summarizes the conclusions.
II. A QUAGMIRE OF CONFUSING VOCABULARY
There is no accepted vocabulary covering the entire array of
different media of exchange, no agreed taxonomy. At first glance, this
does not appear to raise major issues—after all, it is perfectly
acceptable to disagree on terminology. 9 However, problems arise when
7. See Jeff Desjardins, All of the World’s Money and Markets in One Visualization,
VISUAL CAPITALIST (Oct. 26, 2017), http://www.visualcapitalist.com/worlds-money-marketsone-visualization-2017/ [https://perma.cc/KRK7-CHCV].
8. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 33 (2012),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf [https://perma
.cc/VW8Z-57ZN] [hereinafter EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012] (providing a basis for
discussion of various forms of virtual currencies).
9. Bitcoin is known as many things. It has been characterized as “cryptocurrency.” See
ARVIND NARAYANAN, JOSEPH BONNEAU, EDWARD FELTEN, ANDREW MILLER & STEVEN
GOLDFEDER, BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES 20 (Princeton Univ. Press, eds.,
1st ed. 2016). It has been characterized as “virtual currency.” See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
2012, supra note 8, at 6. It has also been characterized as “digital currency.” See Financial
Systems Inquiry, Clearer graduated payments regulation, FSI (Oct. 2015),
http://fsi.gov.au/publications/final-report/chapter-3/graduated-payments/
[https://perma.cc/ZN85-YBEW].

1046 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:4

functionally similar concepts need to be joined together to create a
common classification or when a new technology or its application that
disrupts the existing payment system needs to be integrated into it. The
lack of a common approach creates complications not only for
academics, but also for regulators. 10 Even experts in the field are
presently confused—and scholarship and regulation exist to serve the
interests of far more than the select few:
So, the unsettled vocabulary is relevant to how financial regulators
understand, discuss, and ultimately regulate (or not) the
technology or its uses, as well as how courts will interpret any
regulation or regulatory guidance in the future. However, the
vocabulary problems are also more broadly applicable to any
regulators evaluating the technology, including those outside the
financial sector, as well as to groups considering implementing the
technology in whatever domain. 11

The existing issues with terminology can be summarized as
follows.
First, the concepts of “money” and “currency” are frequently used
interchangeably or inconsistently. 12 From an economic perspective,
this may reflect a failure to appreciate the three separate functions of
the former (unit of account, medium of exchange, store of value) and
the singular defining function of the latter (medium of exchange). In a
legal sense, the problem is even more complex, since the word
“money” is frequently used “as a generic term” without a
corresponding definition and clear meaning. 13

10. See Ross P. Buckley, Jonathan Greenacre & Louise Malady, The Regulation of Mobile
Money in Malawi, 14 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 435, 467-68, 493-94 (2015).
11. Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 718 (2017).
12. See, e.g., EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, at 13 (defining “virtual
currency” as “a type of unregulated, digital money, which is issued and usually controlled by its
developers, and used and accepted among the members of a specific virtual community’”
(emphasis added)). Three years later, the ECB published a new report that adopted a different
view and defined “virtual currency” as “a digital representation of value, not issued by a central
bank, credit institution or e-money institution, which, in some circumstances, can be used as an
alternative to money.” See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES – A
FURTHER ANALYSIS 25 (2015), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrency
schemesen.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX8K-QMU5] [hereinafter EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
2015].
13. See Benjamin Geva, Is Cryptocurrency Money and Why Does It Matter?, TORYS (June
6, 2018), https://www.torys.com/insights/publications/2018/06/is-cryptocurrency-money-andwhy-does-it-matter (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
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Second, different terms are used as synonyms. Frequently, it is
practically impossible to distinguish one term from another without a
corresponding explanation, and, against this background, the
emergence of new types of sovereign digital currency complicate
things even further. Differences between “electronic”, “digital” and
“virtual” currencies are often contrived, and although the parties to the
dialogue concerning current monetary issues seem to understand each
other, it is frequently acknowledged that the existing taxonomy is
confusing. 14
Third, difficulties arise when one term becomes part of another,
without corresponding adjustment or when the same term is used to
describe different issues. 15
Fourth, some of the more recent developments in technology have
become very closely associated with colloquial terms that fail to
convey their defining features or focus on aspects that are not material.
As a result, the emergence of a different, but related technology or
product may make such terms meaningless. Take, for instance, the
word “cryptocurrency.” In existing literature, cryptocurrencies are
classified as decentralized bi-directional (i.e., fully convertible) virtual
currencies (i.e., alternative currencies). 16 However, introduction of
centrally issued digital currencies17 would render this classification
redundant. 18 Furthermore, some of the newer technologies, like
14. In its research on “virtual currencies” the European Central Bank concludes that
“virtual currencies should not be bundled into the generic words of money or currency, even
though their technical appearance takes a form which has some similarities to scriptural money
and/or electronic money” and eventually adopts a different definition that no longer refers to
“money.” See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 25. The research of the Bank
of England concludes that “the phrase ‘digital currency’ is, perhaps, a regrettable one, as it may
invite a number of misunderstandings among casual readers” and “there is no innovation in the
provision of an electronic form of money, as the vast majority of money in a modern economy
is already electronic and has been for some time.” See Barrdear & Kumhof, supra note 6, at 4.
15. In its Guidance on the Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering,
Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, the US Department of Treasury defines “virtual
currency” as “a medium of exchange that operates like a currency in some environments, but
does not have all the attributes of real currency.” See US Department of Treasury Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering,
Exchanging,
or
Using
Virtual
Currencies,
FINCEN
(Mar.
2013)
1,
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JPHXQ2B].
16. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 6; FINANCIAL ACTION TASK
FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL AML/CFT RISKS 5 (2014).
17. For a discussion on centrally issued digital currencies, see infra Section IV.B.3.
18. In its report on digital currencies, the Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”)
stresses that these alternative currencies are “not a liability of any individual or institution.” See
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Bitcoin, are often subject to regulatory scrutiny in the form of warnings,
prohibitions, or express prescriptive rules. The effectiveness of these
measures hinges on clear and unambiguous definitions of their subject
matter—yet regulators frequently reuse the existing terminology and,
by doing so, fail to achieve the clarity required.
Fifth, occasionally new technologies end up being so deeply
associated with their applications, that absurdity results. Blockchain19
is one such example. On the one hand, blockchain and its first
application—Bitcoin—are sometimes used interchangeably. A
publication of the UK government, no less, states:
However, when people talk about the block chain [sic], they tend
to mean the collection of technologies and techniques that
underpin the Bitcoin system, which other projects have used as
inspiration because they solve unrelated problems in finance and
elsewhere. 20

Yet, blockchain is but one of many technologies that, operating
together, give Bitcoin its functionality. To equate blockchain with
Bitcoin is plain silly. On the other hand, the perceived strength and
resilience of Bitcoin has generated the popular, but ridiculous, view
that all blockchains are inherently strong and resilient. 21 This
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, DIGITAL CURRENCIES 4 (2015). The emergence of
an “official” cryptocurrency would change this as well.
19. Blockchain is a special database structure first utilized in Bitcoin to link together data
arranged in individual blocks in append-only chronological order. Bitcoin’s blockchain uses
cryptographic hashing to uniquely identify each block and uses this identification as a reference
to connect different blocks into a single “chain.” Although the basic features of Bitcoin were
explained in a whitepaper by an author named Satoshi Nakamoto, see Satoshi Nakamoto,
Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN (Oct. 2008) https://bitcoin.org/
bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W3N-NZMM], the term “blockchain” was not introduced in the
whitepaper and became widespread only subsequently. For some of the earliest mentions of the
term, see, e.g., richbodo, Usage of the Word “Blockchain,” MEDIUM (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://medium.com/@richbodo/common-use-of-the-word-blockchain-5b916cecef29
[https://perma.cc/UA8H-FK4R].
20. UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond
Block Chain, GOV’T OFF. SCI. (Jan. 2016) 34, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledgertechnology.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB4V-JE84] (emphasis added).
21. See, e.g., MARC PILKINGTON, RES. HANDBOOK DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION 15 (F.
Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016); Chamber of Digital Commerce, Digital Currency
Group & Center for Financial Markets and Policy at Georgetown University McDonough
School of Business, Blockchain and Financial Inclusion (White Paper Mar. 2017) 8,
http://finpolicy.georgetown.edu/sites/finpolicy.georgetown.edu/files/Blockchain%20and%20Fi
nancial%20Inclusion%20120417.pdf [https://perma.cc/E43B-NH7M]; Andrea Tinianow &
Caitlin Long, Transforming the Foundational Infrastructure of Corporate Finance, HARV. L.
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association has proven so strong that lawmakers in Arizona included in
recent legislation that data on a blockchain “is immutable and auditable
and provides an uncensored truth.” 22 This surprisingly maximalist
approach has been subject to thorough critique in the academic
literature but remains in the legislation. 23
In the light of the above issues, this Article proposes a new
taxonomy that accommodates existing currencies and the new and
upcoming variations. This taxonomy possesses five key features.
First, it applies a functional—not a legal—test as the main
criterion. 24 This means that regulatory status does not affect
classification, instead applying the logic “that what walks like a duck,
quacks like a duck, and looks like a duck, is a duck.” One of the benefits
of the suggested classification is that it disregards the objectives for
which currencies may be used, because these features determine their
end-use, rather than functionality, and can lead to endless
categorization into types and sub-types. For example, so-called
community currencies are not classified separately: depending on their
characteristics, they may fall into different categories.
Second, it is regulation-neutral for several reasons. On the one
hand, the law does not always provide a sufficient basis for
classification, omitting some currencies altogether or using
inconsistent terminology. Little would be gained by confirming that
currencies not issued by the state are not considered a lawful currency
and legal tender in that state. 25 On the other hand, regulation frequently
creates exceptions and exclusions from definitions based not on the
underlying features of a certain currency, but instead on its potential to
cause trouble when things go wrong.
One such example abides in EU law, where an electronic store of
value convertible by the issuer into official currency at the 1:1 ratio and
otherwise compliant with the definition of “electronic money,” is not
SCH. FORUM. CORP. GOVERNANCE FIN. REG. (Mar. 16, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2017/03/16/delaware-blockchain-initiative-transforming-the-foundational-infrastructure-ofcorporate-finance/ [https://perma.cc/PYJ4-ZMTN].
22. See An Act Amending Section 44-7003, Arizona Revised Statutes; Amending Title
44, Chapter 26, Arizona Revised Statutes, By Adding Article 5; Relating To Electronic
Transactions § 2 AZ HB2417 (2017) (emphasis added).
23. Walch, supra note 11, at 743-45.
24. Although currencies are analyzed by reference to their functional characteristics, legal
implications still need to be considered—particularly for separating formal and alternative
payment systems, as discussed below.
25. See, e.g., EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 24.
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treated as such. This follows from Article 1(4) of the E-Money
Directive 26 and Article 3(k) of the Payment Services Directive, 27 which
exclude from the scope of the E-Money Directive services “based on
instruments that can be used to acquire goods or services only in the
premises used by the issuer or under a commercial agreement with the
issuer either within a limited network of service providers or for a
limited range of goods or services.” 28
In a similar fashion, Section 9(3) of Australia’s Payment Systems
(Regulation) Act 1998 (“the Act”) permits the Reserve Bank of
Australia (“RBA”) to exempt from the Act certain facilities with
limited impact, having regard to “any restrictions that limit the number
or types of people who may purchase the facility” or “any restrictions
that limit the number or types of people to whom payments may be
made using the facility.” 29 Facilities covered by such exception do not
qualify as “purchased payment facilities” (“PPF”). 30 The RBA has
exercised this authority on a number of occasions, thus excluding,
among other things, (i) gift card facilities,31 (ii) loyalty schemes, 32 (iii)
electronic road toll services, 33 (iv) prepaid mobile phone accounts,34
(v) facilities limited to AUD$10 million (in total) 35 and (vi) facilities
whereby payments can be made to no more than fifty persons. 36
The above exceptions from EU and Australian law are based on
the assumption that the limited scope of certain facilities removes the
26. Directive 2009/110, 2009 O.J. (L 267) (amending Directives 2005/60/EC and
2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC).
27. Directive 2007/64/EC, 2007 O.J. (L 319) (amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC,
2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC), replaced by Directive
2015/2366, 2015 O.J. (L 337) (amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU
and Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC).
28. See Directive 2007/64/EC, art. 3(k), 2007 O.J. (L 319) (amending Directives 97/7/EC,
2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC), replaced by
Directive 2015/2366, 2015 O.J. (L 337) (amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and
2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC).
29. Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 (Cth) § 9(3) (Austl.).
30. Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 (Cth) § 9(1) (Austl.).
31. Reserve Bank of Australia, Declaration No 1 of 2006, RBA,
https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2006/pdf/mr-06-02-purchased-payment-facilities-dec1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDG4-BZDQ].
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Reserve Bank of Australia, Declaration No 2 of 2006, RBA,
https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2006/pdf/mr-06-02-purchased-payment-facilities-dec2.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLF6-2L2U].
36. Id.
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need to regulate them. Also, these exceptions apply to the scope of the
regulatory instruments, rather than the definitions themselves (which
remain largely functional). Although the result is the same (excepted
facilities are not regulated), functionally the exceptions fully satisfy the
relevant definitions of electronic money and purchased payment
facilities, respectively.
Third, the proposed taxonomy is technology-neutral. The problem
with taxonomy based on technology is that technology changes and –
as is demonstrated by the blockchain example above 37 – can be readily
misunderstood.
Fourth, it focuses on the concept of “currency,” 38 rather than
“money” (although certain references to basic theories and technical
concepts are, of course, unavoidable). For the purposes of suggested
functional analysis, the term “money” that is often used in literature is
too abstract: with enough qualifications (such as the limited ability to
perform one or more functions of money), 39 almost anything of value
can be classified as such; 40 conversely, if interpreted more broadly,
many national currencies will not qualify as money either. 41 As a result,
references to the term “money” are often used without further
explanation as if its meaning is obvious, which creates taxonomy
issues. For example, in its taxonomy of money and exchange
mechanisms the Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”) refers to
“money in traditional sense,” clarifying that this means money
“denominated in a sovereign currency.” 42 Overall, a discussion about
the “moneyness” of various assets is outside the scope of this Article.

37. See UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser, supra note 20.
38. Merriam Webster dictionary defines “currency” as “something . . . that is in circulation
as a medium of exchange.” In this Article, currency is thus understood broadly, by reference
only to the medium of exchange function, disregarding other functions of money (such as store
of value and unit of account). Currency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/currency [https://perma.cc/RAF5-HMZE].
39. See LOCKE, infra note 66; LOCKE, infra note 67; TOBIN, infra note 68.
40. See, e.g., Aleksander Berentsen & Fabian Schar, The Case for Central Bank Electronic
Money and the Non-case for Central Bank Cryptocurrencies, 100 FED. RESERVE BANK ST.
LOUIS 97, 97-98 (2018). (taking a broad view on the concept of money and classifying assets
used as a store of value (e.g. gold) as “commodity money”).
41. From the economics perspective, this would be true for highly volatile currencies that
fail to fulfil the store of value function. For further detail, see Garrick Hileman, Alternative
Currencies:
A
Historical
Survey
and
Taxonomy
4-8
(2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2747975 (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
42. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 18, at 6.
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Fifth, the different currencies are examined through the lens of
two payment systems: (i) formal and (ii) alternative. The distinction is
based on their regulatory status, the latter (alternative) being the
residual category. Such breadth of scope is important for a number of
reasons. Unlike regulation, where failure to meet any of the legal
definitions can be an expected outcome (meaning that the facility is not
regulated at all), a taxonomy should be complete. For example, in the
European Union certain community currencies can be classified neither
as “electronic money” (due to Article 1(4) of the E-Money Directive
and Article 3(k) of the Payment Services Directive), nor as “virtual
currencies” (pursuant to section 11 of the Preamble to the Fifth AntiMoney Laundering Directive). 43 Furthermore, the classification needs
to be broad enough to encompass the most recent developments, such
as the emergence of new digital currencies issued by sovereign states.
Finally, a residual approach is already used in the regulation of certain
currencies. As discussed in Section V.B.2, 44 it is possible that the same
facility could qualify as both “electronic money” under the E-Money
Directive and as a “virtual currency” under the Fifth Anti-Money
Laundering Directive – if not for the condition that anything having a
“legal” status of currency or money under the law is not a virtual
currency.
III. USEFUL BUT WORTHLESS: CURRENCY AS THE BACKBONE
OF MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEMS
Early historic forms of money, such as metallic coins that can be
traced back to as early as 2200 BC, 45 possessed inherent value based
on the quality and quantity of materials from which they were made.
This contrasts with modern payment systems that are largely based on
electronic records and ever decreasing use of physical money.
For lawyers, the legal characteristics of money historically
remained secondary to the more pragmatic questions underpinning
commercial turnover – their functionality. The Roman jurist Paul
engaged in a discussion on the legal nature of money only insofar as

43. Directive 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156) (amending Directives 2015/849, 2009/138/EC
and 2013/36/EU).
44. See infra Section V.B.2.
45. For a more detailed discussion of the earlier primitive forms of money, see GLYN
DAVIES, A HISTORY OF MONEY: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY 34-48 (3d ed.
2002).
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was necessary to differentiate between contracts of sale and barter.46
Medieval lawyers explained the distinction between the actual value of
coins and their declared value established by the state not to answer an
abstract legal question about the nature of money, but to comply with
the legal requirements of loan repayments. 47 Even Charles Dumoulin’s
claim that “the form and substance of money, as money, is not its matter
of physical appearance” was simply an argument to support his views
on proper contractual discharge. 48
As a result, the term “money” could have completely different
legal meanings (depending on the circumstances) when interpreted by
lawyers. In a testator’s will, its broad construction was justified, to
encompass various assets in one’s estate. For the purposes of loan
repayment, however, a narrower interpretation was utilized, permitting
only certain coins to be used to discharge an obligation and thus
recognizing that not all coined money was the same. For example,
foreign coins were historically viewed as legally distinct from their
domestic counterparts, as a matter of customary or positive law. 49 In
English law, the concept of “legal tender money” developed from the
legal rules on the performance of debts, which only permitted good
discharge by tendering coins issued or adopted by the Crown. 50 In the
famous 1899 judgment Moss v. Hancock, Justice Darling cited Francis
Walker in “Money, Trade, and Industry” as the author of the best
(legal) definition of money “as currency, and not as medals”:
[T]hat which passes freely from hand to hand throughout the
community in final discharge of debts and full payment for
commodities, being accepted equally without reference to the
character or credit of the person who offers it and without the
intention of the person who receives it to consume it or apply it to
any other use than in turn to tender it to others in discharge of debts
or payment for commodities. 51

The evolution of money eventually proceeded towards monetary
nominalism, by separating the legally recognized value of money from

46. DAVID FOX & WOLFGANG ERNST, MONEY IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION:
MIDDLE AGES TO BRETTON WOODS 7 (1st ed. 2016).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id.
51. Moss v Hancock [1899] 2 Q.B. 116 (Eng.).
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the substance of which it is made. 52 Just like today, technological
innovation was generally outpacing legal change: specialized financial
institutions (i.e., banks) were established to pool money from their
clients, but the law was struggling to adequately explain the nature of
the bank-client relationship, including clients’ rights to balances in
their accounts. 53 At the same time, the sovereign prerogative over
money initially only covered coinage, leaving coin substitutes, such as
bankers’ notes and transferable ledger balances, in the hands of private
parties and outside “formal” financial law. 54 Acceptance of such
substitutes, at least initially, depended on the degree of confidence and
public trust existing among their users, and the substitutes themselves
can be seen as “privately created currencies” operating outside the
sovereign’s monopoly. 55
With time, the sovereign’s monopoly covered even coin
substitutes that were assigned the status of official (i.e., national,
regional or international) currency. 56 In the words of Adam Smith, “[a]
prince who should enact that a certain proportion of his taxes should be
paid in a paper money of a certain kind might thereby give a certain
value to this paper money, even though the term of its final discharge
and redemption should depend altogether upon the will of the prince.”57
This approach was later developed by Georg Knapp, who argued that
the medium which carried the monetary units was not more than a
token (“charta”) with no intrinsic value as a physical substance. 58

52. The 18th century saw the emergence of “commodity-backed” money in the form of
certificates exchangeable for a fixed amount of certain commodity. Unlike the underlying
commodity, this form of money had no intrinsic value: its demand resulted from (i) acceptance
by state and (ii) redeemability into precious metals. This brought greater portability of money
and made possible large-scale transactions. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8,
at 9.
53. FOX & ERNST, supra note 46, at 12.
54. FOX & ERNST, supra note 46, at 14.
55. FOX & ERNST, supra note 46, at 14.
56. In this Article, the term “legal tender” is not used because it may be interpreted more
narrowly, due to restrictions imposed in different countries on the use of certain forms of official
currency. For example, in Australia, Australian cents are not considered legal tender if used in
payments exceeding the maximum limits for coin payments (e.g., coins of the denomination of
five, ten, twenty or fifty cents are considered legal tender only for payments not exceeding
AUD$5 in total. See Currency Act 1965 (Cth) s 16.1(a) (Austl.).
57. ADAM SMITH, On Money considered as a particular Branch of the general Stock of
the Society, or of the Expense of maintaining the National Capital, in AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
58. GEORG FRIEDRICH KNAPP, THE STATE THEORY OF MONEY 32 (1st ed. 1924).
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The state (or chartalist) theory of money 59 can be used to explain
the operation of modern payment systems, including dematerialized
money that exists only as account records. 60 But the fundamentals of
money circulation have not really changed: what serves as currency
must generate sufficient public trust and demand among the end-users
of the payment system. For commercial banks, such public trust and
demand are based on the creditworthiness, liquidity and reputation of
the relevant financial institution. The state, however, has a larger
arsenal at its disposal. First, it has the instruments to generate artificial
demand for its own liabilities (in the form of “official” currency),
including the right to set restrictions on the types of currency it accepts
in payments to itself (e.g., in tax collection) 61 and the right to impose
limitations on the circulation of other currencies (e.g., prohibition of
foreign currency payments among residents 62). Second, it sits atop the
national currency pyramid and cannot be driven into involuntary
default (as long as it only promises to redeem its own liabilities by
payments in its own currency or to itself). 63
The emergence of new types of digital currencies is inextricably
tied to the revisions of the international monetary system in the
twentieth century. Following the 1944 Bretton Woods and 1976
Jamaica reforms, chartalist currency (also commonly referred to as
“fiat” currency) stopped being freely convertible into gold. 64 In a world
where official currencies—possessing neither inherent, nor fixed
redemption value—form the core of the payment system, a search for

59. It can be generally summarized by reference to Abba Lerner: “[W]hatever may have
been the history of gold, at the present time, in a normally well-working economy, money is a
creature of the state. Its general acceptability, which is its all-important attribute, stands or falls
by its acceptability by the state.” Abba P. Lerner, Money as a Creature of the State, 37 AM.
ECON. REV. 312, 313 (1947).
60. For a more detailed discussion and variations of the state theory, see, e.g., JOHN
MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY [1930] 2 (1976); Lerner, supra note 59, at 312.
61. FOX & ERNST, supra note 46, at 639.
62. See, e.g., The Russian Federal Law On Currency Regulation and Currency Control,
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 2011, No 173-FZ, § 9(1) (prohibiting foreign currency operations
among residents with certain exemptions).
63. FOX & ERNST, supra note 46, at 652.
64. Individual states abandoned the precious metal standard at different time. For example,
the Bank of England was relieved of its obligation to pay its own notes and Treasury notes in
gold under the Gold Standard Act 1925. In Australia, the Commonwealth Bank Act 1929 gave
the Treasurer authority to require mandatory exchange of precious metal coins or bullion into
Australian notes.
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alternative currencies was inevitable. The global financial crisis of
2007-2008 merely intensified this search.
Technological development, including the emergence of multiple
public and private telecommunications networks, has resulted in
proliferation of alternative privately issued payment instruments,
including so-called “electronic money” and “virtual currencies.” Some
have not been recognized as part of national payment systems 65 (which
comprise authorized institutions, infrastructure and regulated processes
and are here called “formal” payment systems for short), thus creating
what can be referred to as alternative (and unregulated) payment
systems. In the following Parts IV and V, this Article examines the
concept of currency through the lens of each type of payment system,
starting with the formal one.
IV. THE CONCEPT OF “CURRENCY” IN FORMAL PAYMENT
SYSTEMS
Of the three textbook functions of money (store of value,66
medium of exchange, 67 unit of account), 68 the third one is definitive for
a “formal” payment system: private parties may invest in different
types of assets, from land to securities, to store value and individuals
routinely engage in barter transactions, avoiding the use of any
currency altogether. National and international payment systems,
however, are unthinkable without a commonly accepted material or
immaterial “referent” associated with each unit of account—a shared
standard of value that is acceptable to all within a state or group of
states. The necessary degree of acceptance is attributed by virtue of the
law, which stipulates which instruments function as accepted media of
exchange—the official currency. 69
65. In this Article, the term “payment systems” is interpreted broadly, as a defined set of
institutions, instruments, procedures, and rules for the transfer of money. See EUROPEAN
CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, at 17.
66. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. V, § 47 (1691).
67. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Further Considerations Concerning Raising the Value of
Money [1696], in LOCKE ON MONEY 410 (P.H. Kelly ed. 1991).
68. For the standard definition of money as a unit of account, store of value, and medium
of exchange, see, e.g., JAMES TOBIN, MONEY, CREDIT AND CAPITAL 4 (1998). On the payment
function of money, see Stephanie Bell, The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money, 25
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 149 (2001). For a more detailed discussion on the various functions of
money, see DAVIES, supra note 45, at 27-28.
69. Regarding the United States, see, e.g., 31 U.S.C § 5103 (1965). Regarding the United
Kingdom, see, e.g., Coinage Act 1971 c. 24, § 2 (Gr. Brit.). Regarding Australia, see, e.g.,
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Formal payment systems may differ from country to country both
in terms of structure sophistication 70 and underlying regulation.
Despite existing differences, the common features can be summarized
as follows. First, they utilize or are based upon official state currency,
regardless of whether payments are made in cash (subject to any
applicable upper limit of payment allowed for such transactions) or
non-cash form. 71 Second, a designated authority (usually a central
bank) plays the key role in the design and operation of infrastructure
within which its currency is used. 72 Third, non-cash payments are
predominantly performed via intermediaries, such as commercial
banks (acting as account holders for clients and correspondents for
other financial institutions) and specialized non-bank payment
institutions. 73 Fourth, non-bank actors are increasingly becoming part
of the formal payment system, offering additional services and
increasing the level of competition. 74
Over time, cash payments have been to a large extent replaced
with non-cash alternatives (such as, credit transfers, direct debits,
payment cards, checks, money orders, drafts, bills of exchange, letters
of credit, etc.), which themselves are increasingly switching from
physical to electronic platforms. 75 Nonetheless, despite ongoing
changes, the fundamentals of formal payment systems have remained
Reserve Bank Act 1959 § 36(1) (Austl.). Regarding Israel, see, e.g., Bank of Israel Law 57141954 § 30 (Isr.).
70. In terms of structure, a formal payment system includes key processes (e.g., payment
instruments, processing and settlement), institutions providing deposit and payment services to
clients (e.g., banks) and facilitating clearing and settlement (e.g., interbank funds transfer
systems), binding domestic and international rules, as well as soft law instruments, such as
domestic industry self-regulation and international guidance and practices. See TOM KOKKOLA,
THE PAYMENT SYSTEM, PAYMENTS, SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES, AND THE ROLE OF THE
EUROSYSTEM 25-26 (2010).
71. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANK MONEY IN
PAYMENT SYSTEMS 1 (2003).
72. KOKKOLA, supra note 70, at 19.
73. See generally James Bullard & Bruce D. Smith, Intermediaries and Payment
Instruments, 109 J. ECON. THEORY. 172 (2003).
74. See generally Monzur Hossain & MD. Shahiduzzaman, Development of Non Bank
Financial Institutions to Strengthen the Financial System of Bangladesh, 28 Q. J. BANGLADESH.
INST. BANK. MGMT. 1 (2002).
75. A 1994 article in Wired cites Microsoft’s former CTO Nathan Myhrvold: “Today we
have a zillion different ways of doing financial transactions. There’s cash, checks, credit cards,
debit cards, wiring money, traveler’s checks . . . each of these has a particular point. We’re going
to see that much diversity in digital money.” See Steven Levy, E-Money (That’s What I Want),
WIRED (Jan. 1, 1994), https://www.wired.com/1994/12/emoney/ [https://perma.cc/RS38TKPD]. See also KOKKOLA, supra note 70, at 31-33.
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largely the same: in most cases, new technologies merely add variety
or enhance the efficiency of payment initiation or processing methods
(e.g., e-invoicing or e-reconciliation). At their core, existing formal
payment systems are still predominantly based on two types of money:
official (national or regional) currency 76 and its surrogates. These are
discussed in Sections IV.A and IV.B, respectively. 77
A. Official currency: cash and bank accounts
Even within the same country not all official national currency is
created equal. Central banks sit atop the national currency pyramid,
controlling the circulation of cash and the opening of central bank
accounts. 78 Liabilities of central banks involve no credit or liquidity
risks, as the overall volume of currency issued by a central bank can be
increased as necessary. 79 For this reason, according to the international
standards, payment obligations within systemically important payment
systems should be settled using central bank accounts. 80 By issuing
cash, opening accounts and ensuring convertibility of other authorized
forms of payment into their own liabilities, central banks preserve the
uniform value of national currency, without which national currency
cannot perform its key role in payments—as a unit of account. 81
In practice, the great majority of domestic payment systems settle
using central bank accounts. 82 In an international context involving
settlement in multiple currencies, the settlement processes are
invariably more complex—yet central bank accounts retain their
importance, although to a lesser extent. For example, the Continuous
Linked Settlement (“CLS”) system, which utilizes a dedicated third
party—the CLS Bank—to perform settlement, relies on central banks
76. A related term “legal tender” is not used in this Article. See supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
77. See infra Section IV.A and IV.B.
78. Currency issued by a central bank means, essentially, such central bank’s liabilities
which have the function of a medium of exchange. These liabilities come in two forms
(physical—cash, and digital—central bank accounts) and have five key characteristics: safety,
availability, efficiency, neutrality and finality. See TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA, THE EURO
AND ITS CENTRAL BANK: GETTING UNITED AFTER THE UNION 123 (1st ed. 2004); see also
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 2.
79. KOKKOLA, supra note 70, at 44.
80. Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Core Principles for Systemically
Important Payment Systems, BIS (Jan 2001) 8, https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d43.pdf.
81. KOKKOLA, supra note 70, at 45.
82. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at Annex 3 Table C.

2019]

THE EVOLUTION OF CURRENCY

1059

to make all payments to and from the CLS. 83 This is in contrast to other
multicurrency settlement systems that perform settlement using
commercial bank accounts. 84
While it can be said that commercial banks85 also “create” official
currency by issuing loans, 86 they are limited in performing this function
by several factors: the law generally precludes uncontrolled lending by
establishing mandatory ratios (e.g., capital adequacy ratios) and by
otherwise restricting leverage (not to mention economic factors, such
as central banks’ interest rate policies). 87 Similarly to central bank
money balances, a client account with a commercial bank is essentially
a liability of the latter. 88 This liability, however, is of a lower quality
than a central bank liability, as its originator can mismatch its liquidity
and obligations or otherwise default. For this reason, countries develop
additional instruments to increase public trust in commercial banks, by
establishing deposit insurance and oversight mechanisms, by reserving
resolution powers in the event of financial distress and by adopting
other regulatory measures.
83. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 3.
84. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 3.
85. In some jurisdictions, loans can be issued by other financial institutions that may not
have the status of a “bank.” For example, in Russia, microloans can be provided by
“microfinance organisations.” See The Russian Federal Law On Microfinance Activity and
Microfinance Organisations, SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF]
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2010, No 151-FZ, § 2. As these institutions are
generally subject to similar, but often more relaxed (due to their smaller size and impact),
regulatory requirements, in this Article the term “commercial banks” is interpreted broadly to
include all financial institutions authorized to issue loans and make deposits in official currency
by making records in their own, rather than third party accounts nominated in official currency.
86. While various theories provide different views on this issue (e.g., the financial
intermediation theory, the fractional reserve theory and the credit creation theory), in his recent
study, Werner empirically demonstrates that “each individual bank creates credit and money out
of nothing.” See Richard Werner, Can Banks Individually Create Money Out of Nothing – The
Theories and the Empirical Evidence, 36 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS, 1, 16 (2014); see also
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, THE ROLE OF BANKS, NON-BANKS AND THE CENTRAL BANK IN THE
MONEY CREATION PROCESS (2017).
87. See, e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: international regulatory
framework for banks, BIS, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm [https://perma.cc/8XZ8-UJCS].
88. This is settled both in legal theory and practice. See, e.g., Libyan Arab Foreign Bank
v Bankers Trust Co [1989] QB 728, 21 (treating the fact that a customer “does not own any
money in a bank” and has merely “a personal right” (i.e., a claim) against the bank as “hornbook
law”) (citing Foley v. Hill (1848) 2 H.L.Cas. 28, 36 (“Money, when paid into a bank, ceases
altogether to be the money of the principal . . . it is then the money of the banker, who is bound
to return an equivalent by paying a similar sum to that deposited with him when he is asked for
it . . . The money placed in the custody of a banker is, to all intents and purposes, the money of
the banker, to do with as he pleases.”)).
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A combination of cash and accounts opened by central and
commercial banks is the sine qua non of modern formal payment
systems recognized by most central banks. 89 In this layered system,
non-financial institutions hold their liquidity with commercial banks,
and commercial banks hold their own liquidity with their central
banks. 90 Except for cash, which serves as the only freely available type
of currency issued by central banks, the only other way for most
organizations and individuals 91 to own official currency is through
intermediaries, namely commercial banks—the same institutions that
can create new money out of “thin air.” 92
Despite the advantages of official currency issued directly by a
central bank, its use remains limited. First, transactions in its physical
form (cash) are generally restricted in terms of size (e.g., up to a certain
limit) 93 and of transacting parties (e.g., cash transactions among legal
entities can be prohibited). Second, in most cases its digital form is only
accessible to certain (usually the largest) banks94 and non-bank
financial institutions (e.g., clearing houses), as well as selected noncommercial entities (e.g., the government, foreign central banks and
international organizations). 95 Third, commercial bank accounts offer
advantages that could overshadow the underlying risks (e.g.,
multicurrency and cross-border payments, increased competition,
diversification of payment systems, access to credit, etc.), not to

89. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 1.
90. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 2. This description is
overly simplified, since developed financial systems with multiple banks of different sizes
routinely use a combination of central bank money and commercial bank money for payments
in domestic and foreign currency. It is common for smaller financial institutions with
correspondent accounts at the same top-tier bank to settle without using central bank money at
all. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 3.
91. While individuals are commonly precluded from opening accounts directly with a
central bank, certain exceptions exist (but remain quite rare). One such exception has recently
been eliminated in the UK, where employees at the Bank of England used to have the privilege
of having direct accounts with the central bank. See Gwyn Topham, Bank of England to Close
Personal Banking Service for Employees, THE GUARDIAN (July 18, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/17/bank-of-england-closing-personalbanking-service-employees [https://perma.cc/3CGL-6CBW].
92. Werner, supra note 86; DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, supra note 86.
93. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
94. Relevant policies differ from country to country. For example, the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority strongly encourages all banks to have a settlement account with it. See
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 4.
95. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 3-4.
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mention deposit insurance that provides sufficient security for a large
portion of account holders. 96
B. Surrogates of Official Currency
The level of competition within payment systems has increased
over time. Where banks were unable to offer sufficient territorial
coverage or competitive prices for their services, other businesses
stepped in to close the gap. Of course, these businesses could not issue
official currency, which remained the prerogative of banks. Instead,
non-banks started offering their own liabilities, trying to make them
more attractive to clients by allowing convertibility of such liabilities
into official currency. Thus privately issued surrogates of official
currency (“SOC”) came into being. 97 Where they were more accessible
than bank accounts and more efficient than cash, these surrogates had
a very positive effect on financial inclusion. 98
SOC have different names in different jurisdictions: “mobile
money” or “e-money” in Kenya, 99 “electronic money” in the European
Union, 100 “purchased payment facility” 101 in Australia, “electronic
monetary funds” in Russia. 102 All these concepts have two things in
common: (i) they represent a promise by a recipient of official currency
(the issuer) to follow the payment instructions of the person which has
provided that official currency (the client) and (ii) payment instructions
from the client do not have to be submitted alongside the official

96. See EUROPEAN REPO COUNCIL, THE INTERCONNECTIVITY OF CENTRAL AND
COMMERCIAL BANK MONEY IN THE CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN REPO
MARKET 9-11 (2011).
97. Characterisation of units of value as “surrogates” can be found in paragraph 13 of the
Preamble to the EU Directive 2009/110/EC. See Directive 2009/110/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 267),
Preamble ¶ 13.
98. A prominent example is Kenya and its dominant SOC platform M-Pesa. See Anton
Didenko, Regulating FinTech: Lessons from Africa, 19 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 311, 362 (2018).
99. See, e.g., COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY OF KENYA, FIRST QUARTER SECTOR
STATISTICS REPORT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 2017/2018 13 (2017); CENTRAL BANK OF
KENYA, E-MONEY REGULATION (2013). FATF also uses the term ‘e-money’ and defines it as
“a digital representation of fiat currency used to electronically transfer value denominated in fiat
currency.” See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 4.
100. See Directive 2009/110/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 267), art. 2.2.
101. Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 (Cth) s 9 (Austl.).
102. See The Russian Federal Law On the National Payment System, SOBRANIE
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation] 2011, No 161-FZ, § 3.18.
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currency. 103 Although the resemblance with bank deposits is striking,
the key difference is that the issuer’s liability is not recorded in a bank
account. This remains true regardless of whether the issuer is a bank or
not. 104
At the same time, the type of account alone cannot be
determinative. After all, many organizations (e.g., brokers, clearing
organizations, fund managers) can intermediate their customer funds
and for this purpose also maintain internal accounting systems. Unlike
other forms of intermediation, however, SOC issuers open client
accounts for the sole purpose of facilitating payments, by offering units
in their own accounts – and not in the accounts of banks – as a medium
of exchange. 105
1. Differences from Official Currency
This use of separate units of account instead of official currency
is a defining feature of a SOC, which helps to differentiate SOC from
a range of other payment mechanisms that do not involve the creation
of, and payment in, non-official currency units. This would be the
situation when a payment service provider acts as agent on behalf of
clients to store official currency on their (rather than the agent’s) behalf
and fulfil client payment orders. 106 Similarly, if a payment facility,
however called, operates by providing remote access to a bank account,
it also does not establish a different medium of exchange and, as a
result, a different currency. This distinction becomes especially
important in the context of SOCs offered by banks that can – but should

103. The time lag implies that, in addition to making payments, a SOC issuer also performs
a form of intermediation by storing the value overtime. This is in contrast to money transfer
service providers which do not perform the storage function.
104. This is clear from the Russian Federal Law “On the National Payment System,”
which requires all corporate clients of issuers of electronic means of payment either to open a
separate bank account with the issuer (provided that such issuer is a bank, otherwise it would
have no authority to open one), or to provide to the issuer the details of its third party bank
account. See The Russian Federal Law On the National Payment System, SOBRANIE
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation] 2011, No 161-FZ, § 7.23.
105. Id. at §12.3.
106. In the past, PayPal operated in the United States as an agent for its clients, offering
its clients two different services: (i) custody of funds in PayPal’s accounts, and (ii) transferring
funds from those accounts in accordance with the clients’ instructions. See Paypal, User
Agreement for Paypal Service, SEC (Nov. 2004), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1314052/000131405205000004/ex105a.htm [https://perma.cc/7FB3-52DY].
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not be – confused with currency in bank accounts. Let us consider
evidence found in the law applicable to SOC.
First, deposit insurance protections do not apply to non-bank
accounts and, consequently, do not safeguard holders of SOC balances,
at least directly. 107 The only potential exception known to us might be
the recently announced pass-through of deposit insurance by PayPal
for select users of its new services. 108 A number of jurisdictions have
implemented creative workarounds to promote customer trust in SOC,
such as a duty of the SOC issuer (or its counterparty) to hold liquid
assets (e.g., in the form of official currency) in a bank (commonly
referred to as “float”). 109 In some jurisdictions the float must be held
on trust for the benefit of the SOC issuer’s account holders.110
However, these measures do not change the key mechanics, whereby
deposit insurance does not apply to non-bank accounts. Furthermore,
such protection is fundamentally different from deposit insurance. The
latter kicks in regardless of the status of the asset structure of an
insolvent bank: for all intents and purposes, there could be zero assets
to repay any depositors, but deposit insurance will compensate each of
them, depending on its terms (e.g., subject to the maximum amount
established by the law). 111 If an SOC issuer goes into bankruptcy and
the float held on trust for the clients remains untouched, the clients will
recover up to their respective proportion of the float. 112 Assuming no
restrictions on the number of units of SOC held by each customer, this
could potentially 113 mean recovery of sums exceeding a deposit
insurance cap. But so long as control of the account remains in the
107. See The Russian Federal Law On the Insurance Deposits of Individuals in Banks of
the Russian Federation, SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF]
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2003, No. 177-FZ, § 5.2.5.
108. At the time of writing, this project was still in a testing (“beta”) phase. See Bill Ready,
Taking Further Steps to Help the Unbanked, PAYPAL (April 2018), https://www.paypal.com/
stories/us/taking-further-steps-to-help-the-unbanked [https://perma.cc/7RF6-EH3Z]. It is
unclear how the pass-through of FDIC insurance will be implemented in practice.
109. See, e.g., CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA, supra note 99, cl. 8.
110. See Jonathan Greenacre & Ross P. Buckley, Using Trusts to Protect Mobile Money
Customers, SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 59-78 (2014).
111. This does not mean, however, that an SOC issuer will necessarily be deemed less
reliable compared to a commercial bank. In countries where banking is deemed inefficient or
too expensive, an SOC offered by a leading and well-respected mobile operator is likely to be
widely favoured by the population. This was the situation with M-Pesa when it was launched by
Safaricom in Kenya in 2007.
112. See Greenacre & Buckley, supra note 110, at 67-69.
113. This is unlikely in practice, given that generally SOC balances are lower than
commercial bank deposits.
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hands of the SOC issuer, 114 the trust’s effectiveness is limited to
situations when such issuer has not already misappropriated the float.
This is somewhat similar to the requirement that brokers hold client
funds separately from their own – practice shows that, in financially
difficult times, the temptation to use segregated funds may be too
strong. 115 Other protective measures, such as contractual arrangements
between an SOC issuer and the bank holding the float, are even less
effective than a trust structure – and for this reason their comparison to
deposit insurance is less germane. 116
Second, issuers of SOC are commonly prevented from engaging
in lending activities. 117 Lending in this context clearly refers to the
114. In theory, it is possible to implement a range of protections to put some distance
between an SOC issuer and the float. Some regulators even offer a differentiated approach based
on the nature of this connection. For example, the liquidity requirements listed in Australia’s
Prudential Standard APS 610 ‘Prudential Requirements for Providers of Purchased Payment
Facilities’ do not apply to PPFs that do not hold ‘stored value at risk’, which is the case, inter
alia, when: (i) the funds received in exchange for PPF balances are deposited in an account with
an authorised deposit taking institution (ADI), (ii) the PPF provider has no operational control
over such account and (iii) no creditors aside from beneficiaries of the stored value can have
legal recourse to the asset in that account in the event of insolvency or winding up of activities
of the PPF provider. See Prudential Standard APS 610 § 7. Despite clear policy reasons behind
such differentiated approach, it is very difficult to imagine a situation when all of these
requirements will be met. In fact, back in 2005 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
(APRA) attempted to provide a corresponding example, which involved two companies splitting
different functions among themselves (Company A acting as the provider of the PPF facility,
and Company B controlling the relevant deposit account with an ADI to make payments out of
it). See Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Authorisation and Prudential Supervision
of Providers of Purchased Payment Facilities (Discussion Paper May 2005) 4,
http://www.gtm.apra.gov.au/adi/Documents/ADI-Supervision-of-PPFs-May-2005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8VC-CUSL]. Unfortunately, even in this hypothetical scenario with split
functions and responsibility, Company A would almost certainly have a contractual arrangement
with Company B whereby the latter should honor all of Company A’s instructions relating to
the use of the deposit account with an ADI—in which case Company A remains in control of
the account, albeit indirectly.
115. A prominent example is the case of bankruptcy of MF Global Inc, which—in the face
of financial difficulties—"unlawfully used nearly one billion dollars of customer segregated
funds to support its own proprietary operations and the operations of its affiliates.” See U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. MF Global Holdings Ltd., No. 11-cv-7866
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2016) (order granting consent order for preliminary injunction, civil monetary
penalty and other equitable relief against defendant).
116. See Ramos, Solana, Buckley & Greenacre, supra note 4, at 724-25.
117. See CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA, supra note 99, at cl. 7.6. In a similar fashion, but
using different terminology, Russian law does not allow operators of electronic monetary funds
‘to provide to the client monetary funds for the purposes of increasing the client’s balance of
electronic monetary funds, on the basis of consumer credit agreement’. See The Russian Federal
Law On the National Payment System, SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI
FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2011, No 161-FZ, § 7.5.
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increase of SOC balances not backed by a commensurate contribution
of official currency by the client,118 rather than creation of new official
currency. 119 After all, non-banks cannot create official currency
directly, and so there is no good policy reason to allow them to create
it indirectly, by issuing surrogates freely exchangeable into official
currency. With banks, however, the situation is more complicated,
since even a prohibition on lending strictly in the context of issuing
SOC, even if carefully worded, will be extremely difficult to observe.
The problem is that the fungibility of value stored in bank accounts
makes it extremely difficult to track individual units of official
currency underlying a payment transaction to their source. With cash,
such tracking is outright impossible for bank notes and coins, provided
that individual note numbers are not recorded and tracked. With bank
accounts, which merely represent electronic records, the tracking can
be only circumstantial.
Despite these difficulties, however, it appears to be technically
possible to track a breach of the lending prohibition in respect of SOC
in a situation when (i) a bank (“Bank”) credits official currency to a
bank account (“Account”) of its client (“Client”) as a loan (“Loan”),
(ii) the Client requests the Bank to issue SOC in exchange for some or
all of the balance of the Account, and at the same time (iii) the
following equation is satisfied:
X > A + B, if W = 0 or
X > A + B, if L > W > 0,
where
X – the amount of official currency in the Account exchanged by
the Client for SOC;
A – the amount of official currency in the Account prior to the
issuance of the Loan;
B – the amount of official currency credited to the Account after
the issuance of the Loan but before the reduction of the Client’s
balance by the Bank for the purpose of issuing SOC (assuming that
neither A, nor B includes loans issued by the Bank);

118. Clearly, a lending prohibition cannot relate to bank accounts, as it would make no
sense for banks issuing SOC.
119. Since SOC balances are redeemable in official currency, then the creation of SOC
balances on loan would indirectly lead to the increase in the volume of official currency in
operation.
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L – amount of the Loan; and
W – amount of official currency withdrawn from the Account after
the issuance of the Loan but before the reduction of the Client’s
balance by the Bank for the purpose of issuing SOC.

As is seen from the equation, the amount of the loan in question
is irrelevant – what matters is whether the same currency was used to
issue SOC. Due to inherent fungibility, currency can only be tracked in
this manner using the bank account indirectly, by comparing the loan
amount with the sums received from other sources.
Third, payments with SOC require dedicated know-yourcustomer (“KYC”) procedures that are similar to, but remain separate
from, bank account checks. 120
Fourth, payments with SOC are made using accounts of the SOC
issuer, rather than the accounts of any third party, such as the bank that
holds the float. 121 This remains true even when the SOC issuer engages
a third party. 122
Fifth, even in jurisdictions with dedicated SOC regulation where
units of SOC can be used to fulfil payment obligations, 123 the law
neither recognizes SOC as legal tender124 (the latter remains the
prerogative of official currency), nor permits payments to the state to
be made in units of SOC. 125
It is clear from the discussion above that SOC indeed form a
separate medium of exchange. This said, SOC do not compete with
official currency as such. Instead, they only compete with other
payment mechanisms. 126 In EU law, SOC units have been expressly
recognized as a standalone media of exchange distinct from other forms
of currency: in 2012 Regulation (EC) No. 924/2009 was amended by
clarifying that “electronic money” forms a standalone sub-category of

120. See, e.g., The Russian Federal Law On the National Payment System, SOBRANIE
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation] 2011, No 161-FZ, § 10.
121. Id. at § 7.10.
122. Id. at § 13.4.
123. Id. at §§ 7.17 – 7.18.
124. See Grazhdanskii Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [GK RF] [Civil Code] § 140 (Russ.).
125. See Nalogovyi Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [NK RF] [Tax Code] § 45.3 (Russ.).
126. See CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA, supra note 99, cl. 4 (stating that “currency” includes
“e-money” for the purposes of the definition of “payment instrument”).
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“funds,” alongside banknotes, coins and “scriptural money.” 127 At the
same time, “payment transactions transferring electronic money” were
expressly carved out from the regulation of other payment transactions
using credit and direct debit, due to the specific legal nature of SOC
units: the carve-out applies where payment transactions are settled only
using “electronic money” and is not applied when “such transactions
result in a credit transfer or direct debit to and from a payment account
identified by BBAN or IBAN.” 128 Equally important is the very
definition of “electronic money” in Article 2(2) of the EU Directive
2009/110/EC as “electronically . . . stored monetary value,” which
shows that units of “electronic money” themselves possess a monetary
value of their own. This value is based on the convertibility into official
currency but is clearly separate from the value of units of official
currency.
Legal differences, in turn, lead to differences in utility and usage
models. On the one hand, the SOC business model is built around the
medium of exchange function of SOC units. According to the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (“APRA”), “PPF providers
primarily earn fees from services linked to facilitating the function of
money as a medium of exchange, not through making advances of
money.” 129 On the other hand, SOC offer only rudimentary
functionality as a store of value, due to existing restrictions on balances
held as SOC and prohibitions on the payment of interest. 130
2. Connection to Official Currency
Let us now consider the close connection of SOC to official
currency—a factor that categorizes this medium of exchange as a
surrogate, rather than as a standalone alternative currency. 131
First, existing SOC schemes do not alter the supply of official
currency. SOC do not alter the fundamental mechanics of the payment
127. See Regulation 260/2012, art. 17(1), 2012 O.J. (L 94) 33-34 (establishing technical
and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro and amending Regulation
924/2009, 2012 O.J. (L 94)).
128. Id. at art. 1(2)(f).
129. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, supra note 114, at 5. APRA further
explains that, consequently, stored value is “largely a residue of the services provided,” rather
than a source of funding for other operations. See Id.
130. In a number of jurisdictions payments of interest on SOC balances have been
permitted. For more detail, see Malady, Tsang & Buckley, supra note 4.
131. For a discussion on alternative currencies and their classification, see infra Section
V.
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system built around official currencies. Although SOC represent a
separate medium of exchange, units of SOC can only be obtained in
exchange for official currency (they cannot be lent). 132 Similarly, these
units can exit the internal accounting system of the SOC issuer by
exchange into official currency. These exchanges are done at par or at
least at par. 133
Second, SOC regulations frequently mirror regulations governing
bank deposits. 134
Third, SOC are becoming increasingly associated with the formal
financial system. A prominent example is the World Bank’s Findex
database which counts as financially excluded, people “without an
account at a financial institution or through a mobile money
provider.” 135 Another example is the newly adopted Fifth AML
Directive, which treats “electronic money” as a type of fiat currency,
alongside “coins and banknotes that are designated as legal tender.” 136
3. SOC as Part of the Formal Payment System
Over time, SOC systems have matured and are now exhibiting
even more similarities with regular bank accounts. Some SOC projects
have evolved to provide greater credibility in the eyes of prospective
users (e.g., by establishing trust facilities to safeguard customers
against the insolvency of the SOC issuer). 137 Although historically
SOC products were not interest-bearing, the situation is beginning to
change, further reducing the gap between bank accounts and SOC
accounts. 138 As the gap is reducing, so are SOC products becoming part
132. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
133. See Directive 2009/110/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 267), art. 11.
134. See The Russian Federal Law On the National Payment System, SOBRANIE
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation] 2011, No 161-FZ, § 10.11 (providing that interruption of payments using electronic
monetary funds is permitted in cases and in the manner that are analogous to those applicable to
bank accounts).
135. ASLI DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT, ET AL., THE GLOBAL FINDEX DATABASE 2017: MEASURING
FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND THE FINTECH REVOLUTION 4 (2018).
136. See Directive 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156) (amending Directive 2015/849, 2015 O.J.
(L 141)); Directive 2009/138/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 335); Directive 2013/36/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 176),
Preamble ¶ 8. This is done to contrast SOC with so-called “virtual currencies.”
137. See Greenacre & Buckley, supra note 110. For a discussion on alternative protection
mechanisms in the context of Civil Law jurisdictions, which do not recognize the concept of
trust, see Ramos, Solana, Buckley & Greenacre, supra note 4.
138. Tanzania’s Tigo Pesa is arguably the first interest-earning e-money product. See
Tsang, Malady & Buckley, supra note 4. Although the same is not true for the United Kingdom
and the United States, payment of interest is a defining feature of a bank deposit in certain
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of existing formal payments systems. After all, both (bank and SOC
accounts) are pursuing the common goal of ensuring greater inclusion
of domestic actors in the formal payment system based on official
currency to minimize the risks associated with cash-based payments
and give the regulators a better grasp or financial flows in the economy
(among other underlying factors).
The notion of public trust remains just as important for SOC as
for bank currency (i.e., deposits) but is generated through different
channels. In the case of a bank account, client security is achieved
through licensing requirements, deposit insurance schemes, and
resolution powers over banks in case of financial distress. The same
protections do not always apply to SOC providers. First, in most
jurisdictions regulators do not have special resolution powers in the
event of financial difficulties of SOC issuers (as opposed to distressed
commercial banks, which can be subject to a variety of recovery
procedures, from management replacement, to the transfer of toxic
assets to a third party). 139 Second, since deposit insurance rules do not
always apply to SOC issuers, 140 the latter are often forced to adopt other
measures to ensure that their own insolvency does not adversely affect
their client’s money. 141
This functional similarity to bank deposits can also help to explain
why—despite a variety of attempts—SOC systems have been largely
unsuccessful (with some notable exceptions). The two business models
(SOC and electronic banking) are commonly engaged in direct
competition, which often precludes the development of SOC in
countries with established banking systems (this is generally due to
high costs of implementation and also competition from incumbent
financial institutions). 142 A prime example is Australia, where after
almost ten years only PayPal is the only PPF provider to have been
registered. Notable exceptions can be found in countries with large
numbers of unbanked people, where SOC can become a viable
alternative to a bank account: in Kenya, the mobile money platform MPesa became an instrument of financial inclusion for the majority of the
jurisdictions. For an example in Russia, see The Civil Code of the Russian Federation,
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] § 834, ¶ 1.
139. Kenya is a notable exception. See Kemp & Buckley, supra note 4, at 1551-52.
140. See, e.g., Juan Carlos Izaguirre, Claire McGuire & Dave Grace, Deposit Insurance
for Digital Financial Products: 3 Approaches, CGAP, http://www.cgap.org/blog/depositinsurance-digital-financial-products-3-approaches [https://perma.cc/83SD-XAWX].
141. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
142. KOKKOLA, supra note 70, at 33-34.
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population at a time when formal banking was perceived as expensive,
time-consuming and generally inaccessible. 143 Similarly high levels of
impact from SOCs has been seen in Tanzania, Uganda, the Philippines,
and other countries. 144
C. Development trends in formal payment systems
Formal payment systems are continuously evolving. Recent
trends include the following.
Technological advancement and increasing complexity.
Developments in technology have made possible the
establishment and widespread adoption of real-time gross
settlement (RTGS) systems where each payment is settled intraday in real-time (as opposed to settlement of net positions at the
end of a specified period). 145 Wholesale settlement requires a
substantially larger money pool to operate efficiently, and thus
generally utilizes central bank money (in terms of accounts used
for settling payment obligations and intra-day loans provided by
central banks). 146 At the same time, the speed of technological
development tends to reduce the payment system’s lifecycle: many
existing wholesale payment systems are programmed in obsolete
languages or use outdated database designs. 147 The process of
modernisation of existing payment systems and development of
new ones 148 creates a fertile ground for the adoption of new
technologies, such as distributed ledger technology (DLT): a

143. For an overview of the challenges associated with Kenya’s banking sector, see
EMCompass, How Fintech is Reaching the Poor in Africa and Asia: A Start-Up Perspective,
IFC
(Mar.
2017),
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/f745fd31-a9aa-4736-b0ba4ac2956f96dc/EmCompass+Note+34+DFS+and+FinTech+Mar+28+FINAL.pdf?MOD=AJPE
RES [https://perma.cc/85AN-UHYN].
144. Tavneet Suri, Mobile Money, 9 ANN. REV. ECON, 497, 506-08 (2017).
145. See, for example, CHAPS in the UK, RITS in Australia.
146. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 4.
147. Bech & Garratt, supra note 6, at 66.
148. For an example of a recent initiative to modernize the national payment system, see,
e.g., News Release, Bank of England, A Blueprint for a New RTGS Service for the United
Kingdom (May 9, 2017), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/news/2017/may/
a-blueprint-for-a-new-rtgs-service-for-the-united-kingdom.pdf?la=en&hash=C3C5EFE19203
BBEDF725BEFB6D45CFDC0504D6FE [https://perma.cc/P7D9-FV7R]. Another example
comes from Australia, which launched a New Payments Platform in February 2018 “to provide
a platform for innovation and competition in the provision of payment services.” See Reserve
Bank of Australia, Launch of the New Payments Platform, (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2018/mr-18-02.html [https://perma.cc/HFJ2-8V87].
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number of central banks have already completed proofs of concept
for DLT applications. 149
Concentration of payment system risks. For various reasons
(e.g. business specialization or bank consolidation) individual
financial institutions end up concentrating significant volumes of
payment activities, sometimes equalling in scope the size of entire
payment systems of certain countries. This prompts central banks
to react and to revise their approach to payment systems, e.g. by
creating more competitive settlement mechanisms or enhancing
oversight of systemically important institutions. 150 In the long
term, in such cases, central banks might consider taking over the
payment settlement process to prevent further consolidation of
risks.
Increasing demand for central bank accounts and services.
Increased cross-border flows of money resulting from financial
globalisation and the establishment of settlement facilities
operating with multiple currencies imposes additional pressure on
central banks, such as the need for greater access to intraday credit.
In addition, non-bank financial institutions (and some nonfinancial institutions) are requesting broader access to central bank
accounts and operations in central bank money, as well as to
improve the services utilising central bank money (by allowing
longer operating hours, multicurrency functionality or
otherwise). 151

Overall, formal payment systems are predominantly operating as
multi-level domestic and cross-border payment systems dominated by
intermediaries (both nationally and internationally). These
intermediaries are typically commercial banks but also include frontend, back-end, and end-to-end providers, as well as operators of retail
payment infrastructure. 152 These systems are given official status by
dedicated laws and regulations. 153 High volumes of foreign exchange
149. Bech & Garratt, supra note 6, at 66.
150. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 4-5.
151. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 5, 43; see also ITUT FOCUS GROUP ON DIGITAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, ACCESS TO PAYMENT INFRASTRUCTURES
(2016), https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/focusgroups/dfs/Documents/09_2016/Access%20to%20
Payment%20Infrastructures.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT64-WNAX].
152. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, NON-BANKS IN RETAIL PAYMENTS
9 (2014).
153. See, e.g., The Russian Federal Law On the National Payment System, SOBRANIE
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation] 2011, No 161-FZ.

1072 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:4

operations and the emergence of major financial institutions engaged
in cross-border transactions 154 drive financial internationalization,
which, nonetheless, remains largely decentralized and based on
correspondent accounts with commercial banks. 155 New technologies,
like DLT, offer alluring prospects of resolving some of the existing
issues (such as high infrastructure costs relating to cross-border
payments, securities trading and regulatory compliance) 156 and attract
significant attention, but so far appear a somewhat distant
opportunity. 157
V. THE CONCEPT OF “CURRENCY” IN ALTERNATIVE
PAYMENT SYSTEMS
The unit of account function of currency used in a formal payment
system is maintained through guaranteed conversion of recognized
forms of currency into central bank liabilities. 158 This ensures the
overall stability of the system and public trust in formal fiat currency,
which is, of course, intrinsically worthless. By necessity, such a system
functions in a closed loop, covering only those types of currency which
are accepted by the law. In contrast, “alternative payment systems”
operate outside such a loop and cover those processes, institutions, and
practices, which are not based on cash, central bank, or commercial
bank accounts and are thus conceived as standalone systems. As a
result, these systems can be expressly prohibited by law or, to take
another extreme, be subject to no specific rules at all.
Alternative payment systems operate within dedicated user
groups (e.g., virtual communities159 or users of a particular electronic
protocol) and utilize alternative currency units instead of official state
currency for settlement purposes. 160 Payment systems established by
154. KOKKOLA, supra note 70, at 61.
155. KOKKOLA, supra note 70, at 62.
156. A recent report by Santander InnoVentures, Oliver Wyman, and Anthemis Group
projects the pertinent savings from the application of distributed ledger technology in the region
of US$15-20 billion per annum by 2022. See MARIANO BELINKY, EMMET RENNICK & ANDREW
VEITCH, THE FINTECH 2.0 PAPER: REBOOTING FINANCIAL SERVICES 15 (2015).
157. See, e.g., Chris Skinner, Applying Blockchain to Clearing and Settlement, BANKNXT
(Aug.
16,
2016),
https://banknxt.com/57632/blockchain-clearing-and-settlement/
[https://perma.cc/7PLN-Z3WR].
158. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
159. A virtual community can be defined as ‘a place within cyberspace where individuals
interact and follow mutual interests or goals’. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note
8, at 11.
160. There is no uniform classification of these units. See infra Section V.A.
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such user groups often resemble their “formal” counterparts: they can
be subject to the same kinds of risks, 161 and the level of acceptance of
settlement units used in these systems depends on the level of public
trust attributable to them by end-users. The special characteristics of
alternative currency units utilized as a medium of exchange, however,
make alternative payment systems quite distinct. First, since the
settlement unit is the alternative currency itself (as opposed to official
currency), 162 finality and irrevocability of payments cannot be
guaranteed as a matter of law. Second, while some methods of
achieving end users’ demand for virtual currencies can be quite similar
to those applied in a formal payment system (e.g., the developers of a
computer game may require all payments among players to be
performed in a single, specially created virtual currency), 163 others
focus on the perceived advantages of such currencies, such as
anonymity or pseudonymity (compared with bank accounts),
settlement speed (compared with foreign exchange retail banking
transactions), or lack of regulatory oversight. 164
A. Taxonomy of Alternative Currencies
In this Article, the words “alternative currency” are used with a
broad meaning, to cover the whole array of currencies operating outside
the formal payment system. This is in contrast to the existing literature,
which largely focuses on specific currencies or even currency groups,
but does not provide a comprehensive picture. For example, in recent
years, a lot of attention has been dedicated to the terms “virtual

161. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, at 40.
162. See supra Section IV.A.
163. Compare the official state currency authorized by law to be used for the settlement
of debts. This said, even computer game economies find their way into the formal payment
system, albeit often in violation of terms of use, which prohibit transactions with “real” money.
See, e.g., Blizzard Entertainment, Blizzard Termination of Service Agreement, BLIZZARD ENT.,
https://www.blizzard.com/en-sg/legal/b8a1574a-8137-44ad-acf0-11c92e90b26f/blizzardtermination-of-service-agreement [https://perma.cc/PAW3-F2BE]; see also infra note 182.
164. See, e.g., EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 18-19. Some of these
perceived advantages have already caused serious concern among regulators across the globe.
See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 30-32.
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currency” 165 and “digital currency” 166 (and their classification). Both
terms are rather unfortunate, however. The former accurately reflects
the fact that many alternative currencies operate within virtual
communities (like computer games or social networks) but does not sit
well with the fact that units like Bitcoin are commonly used in real-life
economy transactions. The latter term, digital currency, addresses this
inconsistency but creates another: currency used in “formal” payment
systems is also predominantly digital 167 and exists in the form of
account records, so the distinction appears somewhat contrived.
Needless to say, occasionally one term is replaced with the other, with
the only increase being in terms of obfuscation.168 In other cases, one
of the terms is simply not used to avoid confusion with the other. 169 In
addition, existing classifications are frequently incomplete, as they do
not include so-called “complementary” (or “community”) currencies or
focus on non-physical currencies, particularly in the light of the recent
explosion of so-called “cryptocurrencies” (a misnomer discussed in
Section V.A.4 below). 170 Any taxonomy excluding these latter
categories is incomplete.
There are many ways to classify alternative currencies. This
Article will consider three key universal criteria in Sections V.A.1 to
V.A.3 and will then discuss the special characteristics of the new group
of alternative currencies inspired by Bitcoin (in Section V.A.4).171
1. Physical or Digital?
The vast majority of alternative currency types are digital.
However, exceptions still exist. First, in a number of regions across the
165. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8; EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
2015, supra note 12. European Banking Authority, EBA Opinion on “Virtual Currencies,” EBA
(July
4,
2014),
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-201408+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8FJ-LT2G]; INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND BEYOND: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS (2016); US
Department of Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, supra note 15.
166. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 18, at 1; Barrdear & Kumhof,
supra note 6; Max Raskin & David Yermack, Digital Currencies, Decentralized Ledgers, and
the Future of Central Banking (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
22238, 2016), https://ccl.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Raskin_Max_and_Yermack_David_
The%20Future%20of%20Central%20Banking.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZR7E-Q6QJ].
167. See Desjardins, supra note 7.
168. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 18, at 1, n.2.
169. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 4.
170. See infra Section V.A.4.
171. See infra Sections V.A.1-4.
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globe, tribes and other local groups continue to rely on archaic
currencies like seashells. 172 Second, physical alternative currencies in
the form of paper notes are used today by local communities in major
countries like the United Kingdom. 173 Third, there is nothing
precluding a group of people from using virtually any medium as a
currency in transactions among them.
Physical community currencies, like the Bristol Pound, 174 are
particularly interesting, since they operate in countries with wellestablished and highly sophisticated payment infrastructures.
Furthermore, there are attempts to integrate these currencies into the
existing payment system, at least at a local level (e.g., by ensuring their
exchangeability into official currency 175 or allowing payment of local
taxes using community currency). 176
2. Convertible or Non-convertible?
“Virtual” or “digital” currencies177 are often classified on the basis
of the convertibility criterion. 178 The same approach can be applied to
all alternative currencies. Thus, in terms of convertibility into
172. For example, this is the case in the Solomon Islands, where strings of polished
seashells are accepted by merchants. See Pei-yi Guo, From Currency to Agency: Shell Money in
Contemporary Langalanga, Solomon Islands, ACADEMIA, https://www.academia.edu/1613812/
From_Currency_to_Agency_Shell_Money_in_Contemporary_Langalanga_Solomon_Islands
[https://perma.cc/9SHE-A2FZ]. For a more recent description, see Nick Sas, These Pacific
Islanders Are Betting on a Seashell Currency Boom, VICE (Jan. 11 2018),
https://www.vice.com/en_au/article/paqmx7/these-pacific-islanders-are-betting-on-a-shellmoney-boom [https://perma.cc/75DH-WT4Y].
173. See infra note 174.
174. There are a number of similar projects. For examples of projects in the UK, see
TOTNES POUND, https://www.totnespound.org/ [https://perma.cc/NZZ2-N52S]; LEWES POUND,
https://www.thelewespound.org/
[https://perma.cc/9RGH-FD6P];
EXETER
POUND,
http://www.exeterpound.org.uk/
[https://perma.cc/2KA8-HD5Q];
CARDIFF
POUND,
http://cardiffpound.co.uk/
[https://perma.cc/77AG-2C7X];
BRIXTON
POUND,
http://brixtonpound.org/ [https://perma.cc/FNU6-BWZ8].
175. See infra note 190-92 and accompanying text.
176. For example, the council tax in Bristol can be paid in Bristol Pounds. See
https://bristolpound.org/pay-council-tax-business-rates-bristol-pounds/ [https://perma.cc/78Y4JHZV].
177. See supra notes 165-66.
178. The European Central Bank distinguishes three categories: (i) “closed” virtual
currency schemes, (ii) virtual currencies with “bidirectional flow,” and also (iii) virtual
currencies with “unidirectional” flow, which combine certain features of the first two categories.
See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, at 13-14. For an alternative approach, which
does not recognize such an “intermediate” category, see FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra
note 16, at 4; FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: GUIDANCE FOR A RISKBASED APPROACH 26-27 (2015).
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currencies used in formal payment systems and vice versa, each
alternative currency can be allocated to one of three groups: (i) nonconvertible (or closed), (ii) semi-convertible and (iii) fully convertible
(or open). At first glance, most alternative currencies operating in
offline – and many online – computer games should belong to the first
category: these units are generally obtained as a reward for performing
relevant tasks (e.g., defeating foes, completing quests) and can only be
spent on virtual items and benefits. The second category is interesting,
as it encompasses a variety of alternative currencies that can be
obtained with official currency or SOC but cannot be freely exchanged
vice versa (at least in accordance with the rules of the alternative
payment system). 179 Bitcoin and other similar currencies (discussed in
Section V.A.4) 180 belong to the third category: they are usually created
specifically as alternatives to legally recognized forms of money and
can be converted into official currency or SOC. 181 The use of
convertibility as a classification criterion is nevertheless problematic,
since there can be different approaches to determining whether an
alternative currency is truly convertible.
First, if the actual capacity to be exchanged into official currency
or SOC is sufficient, then such classification will turn on the factual
circumstances, namely the existence or absence of a precedent whereby
a certain alternative currency has ever been converted. But since almost
anything of value can be exchanged into official currency or SOC, this
would mean that even computer game currency could be deemed
convertible. A good example is the existence of so-called “black
markets” of in-game currencies allowing purchases of virtual currency
balances for official currency. 182 Furthermore, this approach lacks
certainty, since not all conversions of alternative currency are recorded
or able to be easily tracked. 183
Second, only convertibility provided directly by the issuer could
be recognized. This approach makes classification easier but has
problems of its own. An obvious difficulty is with alternative

179. These include, for example, PlayStation Store credit, Steam Wallet balance, and
various loyalty programs.
180. See discussion infra Section V.A.4.
181. For the rationale behind the issuance of Bitcoin, see Nakamoto, supra note 19.
182. See, e.g., G2G.COM, https://www.g2g.com/ [https://perma.cc/W5VJ-SVYB]. The
website matches buyers and sellers of various computer game currencies.
183. This makes the “non-convertible” status rather tricky; it disappears the moment any
conversion takes place.
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currencies that have no single issuer, 184 which would have to be
characterized as non-convertible despite the growth of exchanges
specifically created to allow conversions of such currencies. 185 In
addition, it is unclear how to characterize currencies for which the
issuer has not established a direct conversion into official currency or
SOC, but nevertheless permits it indirectly. 186
Third, convertibility could be based on existing legal restrictions
capable of making exchange of alternative currency not only
unenforceable, but also unlawful. A recent example can be found in the
draft Russian Federal Law “On Digital Financial Assets,” which
permits exchange of “digital financial assets” (a general term that
includes “cryptocurrencies” and “tokens”) only to the extent that they
are expressly permitted by the law. 187
Semi-convertible (also known as unidirectional) alternative
currencies are a good illustration of the diversity of the broad category
of alternative currencies. For the former, limited convertibility is not
always a flaw, but can be an important advantage.188 This is true of
alternative currencies intended to lock in the issuer’s clients (e.g., as

184. See infra Section V.A.3.
185. See, e.g., BITSTAMP, https://www.bitstamp.net/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019);
BITFINEX,
https://www.bitfinex.com/
[https://perma.cc/7MD9-5AMA];
COINBASE
https://www.coinbase.com/charts (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
186. Over time, many computer games with online functionality (e.g., massively
multiplayer online games) and mobile platforms (iOS, Android, and Windows Mobile) have
developed dedicated conversion mechanisms, allowing players to purchase in-game money with
official currency or SOC. A recent example is the introduction of the World of Warcraft Token—
an alternative in-game currency which can be purchased by players using the main in-game
currency (World of Warcraft gold, silver, or copper). The token is convertible into yet another
alternative currency (Blizzard Balance), which can be used outside the game to purchase various
digital goods and services provided by the developer. Blizzard Balance uses official currency as
the unit of account and can be obtained via official currency but is not itself convertible into any
official currency and is not accepted by third parties. This makes it a semi-convertible alternative
currency. See WoW Token, BLIZZARD SHOP, https://us.shop.battle.net/en-us/product/world-ofwarcraft-token [https://perma.cc/LAY7-5TST]. For information on restrictions imposed on the
use
of
WoW
tokens,
see
Using
a
WoW
Token,
BLIZZARD,
https://us.battle.net/support/en/article/31218 [https://perma.cc/GT95-37QE].
187. See Draft Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Digital Financial Assets,” § 4
(May 22, 2018), http://sozd.parliament.gov.ru/bill/419059-7 [https://perma.cc/RQ58-L4R6].
Conversion of “tokens” into Rubles and foreign official currency is allowed only via special
domestic exchanges, whereas conversion of other kinds of “digital financial assets” is subject to
bespoke rules to be prepared by the Bank of Russia following a consultation with the
Government.
188. This is in contrast to SOC, for which close association with official currency is
paramount. See supra Section IV.B.2.
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part of loyalty programs) or to prevent official currency from escaping
a certain area or region (e.g., community currencies).
In some cases, different forms of the same alternative currency
may enjoy different levels of convertibility. A good example would be
an existing community currency—the paper version of the Bristol
Pound—that was mentioned in the previous section. According to the
relevant terms and conditions, convertibility of the Bristol Pound
physical notes depends on the status of the client. Non-business clients
are unable to lawfully exchange Bristol Pound notes into pound sterling
(“GBP”) (or any other currency) and remain effectively locked in after
purchasing the physical units (at one to one ratio against the GBP).189
Businesses, on the other hand, can do a two-step conversion. 190 First,
the paper notes are exchanged for an electronic balance with the Bristol
Credit Union. 191 Second, this electronic balance is converted into
GBP. 192
Limited convertibility of paper Bristol Pounds aims to ensure that
currency obtained in the region stays in the region (as it is only accepted
by participants of the scheme). The restriction is artificially created and
could hinder market efficiency, but economic aspects of community
currencies are outside the scope of this Article. 193 What matters is that
this limitation is part of the design and is seen as its strength, rather
than a weakness.

189. See Bristol Pound, Terms and Conditions for your Bristol Pound Account, 5.9,
https://bristolpound.org/wp-content/uploads/Bristol_Pound_Individual_Terms__
Conditions.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH3B-PYFN] [hereinafter Bristol Pound, Terms and
Conditions]; Bristol Pound, Terms and Conditions for Paper Bristol Pounds, second edition
2015,
5,
https://bristolpound.org/wp-content/uploads/PaperBristolPoundsTerms_
Conditions2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3LS-YN46] [hereinafter Bristol Pound, Second
Edition].
190. The need to allow businesses to convert Bristol Pound balances is understandable –
after all, taxes still need to be paid in official currency. The only exception is the Bristol council
tax, which is payable in Bristol Pounds as well. See Bristol Pound, Did you know you can pay
your council tax and business rates in Bristol Pounds (Mar. 16 2016), https://bristolpound.org/
pay-council-tax-business-rates-bristol-pounds/ [https://perma.cc/YJ7V-8LYR].
191. See Bristol Pound, Scheme Rules for Individual Members and Trader Members, 1112,
https://bristolpound.org/wp-content/uploads/Bristol-Pound-Scheme-Rules-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2VNQ-TH5V].
192. Id.
193. Community currencies frequently implement other artificial restrictions, such as
expiry date on physical notes, to encourage spending. For example, the second edition of paper
Bristol Pounds is valid until 30 September 2018. See Bristol Pound, Second Edition, supra note
189, at 8.
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Interestingly, unlike physical Bristol Pounds, electronic accounts
denominated in Bristol Pounds are freely exchangeable into GBP. This
raises an important question of separating alternative currencies from
SOC. Indeed, if each facility allows conversion into official currency,
then where is the fine line between them? This matter is discussed in
some detail in Section V.B.2 below. 194
3. Centralized or Decentralized?
In terms of issuance and administration method, alternative
currencies can be centralized (i.e., have a single center of issuance and
administration) or be decentralized (i.e., not have a central authority
and control mechanism). 195 Many digital alternative currencies
followed the example of Bitcoin (which was the first truly
decentralized alternative currency) and do not exist as records kept with
a single trusted party (such as the issuer). They use other methods to
offer greater transparency and resilience, such as a publicly accessible
register of transactions shared among users, and blockchain and
cryptographic hashing to prevent manipulation of transaction
records. 196
At the same time, transparency and resilience alone are not
enough. In a truly decentralized system, end-users who adopt the
relevant currency may wish to have the collective ability to tweak its
parameters to improve certain features, correct mistakes or modernize
the currency to adjust to the changing technological, legal or economic
realities. Elimination of a trusted intermediary creates the need for a
decision-making layer and end-user democracy. In the history of
Bitcoin (discussed in the upcoming section), 197 the corresponding
changes are represented by a “proof-of-work” 198 consensus algorithm

194. See infra Section V.B.2.
195. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 9; FINANCIAL ACTION TASK
FORCE, supra note 16, at 5.
196. How do Bitcoin Transactions Work?, COINDESK (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.coindesk.com/information/how-do-bitcoin-transactions-work [https://perma.cc/
P9MP-977G].
197 See infra Section V.A.4.
198. In a proof-of-work algorithm, different user-operated nodes try to solve a resourceintensive mathematical problem. “The first node to solve the problem is compensated, while all
others use the solution provided by the first node to verify that the problem has been correctly
solved.” Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley & Douglas W. Arner, The Distributed Liability of
Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1372 n.44 (2018).
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and so-called “forks” in the development of the currency protocol, in
particular “hard forks” that essentially split the user base. 199
4. The Bitcoin Legacy
The launch of Bitcoin 200 in 2009 gave rise to the subsequent
development of a whole range of new digital alternative currencies
(now commonly referred to as “cryptocurrencies”), the number of
which has skyrocketed. According to some calculations, in 2015 their
overall number reached 500, 201 and at the time of writing, in mid-2018,
it has more than tripled, to over 1,700. These figures have been
increasing steadily and have become significantly outdated by the time
this Article is published, exceeding 2,100. 202
The word used to collectively describe Bitcoin and its spin-offs—
“cryptocurrency”—is extremely confusing. After all, cryptography is
an implicit feature not only of most digital alternative currencies, but
also bank accounts and SOC. This makes the term “cryptocurrency”
essentially meaningless in the context of this Article. Unfortunately,
alternative names (like “algorithmic digital currencies”) are not that
much better. 203 The reason is the same: the terms do not capture the
entire specter of digital alternative currencies that were brought into
existence following Bitcoin’s lead.
Let us consider Bitcoin alone for now. From a technical
perspective, this digital currency is a combination of various
technologies, including: (i) blockchain 204 (based on hashing transaction
data) 205 (ii) use of distributed ledger technology, whereby the
transaction database is shared among all users, (iii) a special consensus
algorithm called “proof of work,” 206 and (iv) very high but flexible
199. Walch, supra note 11, at 738-39.
200. Bitcoin was the first cryptocurrency and the first decentralized convertible virtual
currency. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 5-6. For additional detail, see
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, at 22; Nakamoto, supra note 19.
201. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 4.
202. See All Cryptocurrencies, supra note 1.
203. See Raskin & Yermack, supra note 166, at 1. It is unclear which algorithms are
covered. If these are cryptographic algorithms, then the problem is the same as with
“cryptocurrencies.” If these are algorithms designed to generate new currencies, these exist even
in the simplest of digital alternative currencies, making it hard to identify algorithmic currencies
as a separate group.
204. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
205. Bitcoin uses a hashing algorithm called SHA-256. Even a slight variation of the input
data results in an entirely different hash.
206. See ZETZSCHE, BUCKLEY & ARNER, supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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requirements for confirming new transactions. 207 Although many
digital alternative currencies have attempted to copy the Bitcoin
structure, others have chosen to alter certain features, to create a unique
currency, with a different set of resulting characteristics. 208 There is
simply no common denominator, and this variety makes it impractical
to develop a single term for all the Bitcoin spin-offs.
B. Alternative Currencies: Legal Status and Regulatory Implications
1. Uncertain Legal Status of Alternative Currencies
Only certain types of alternative currencies have triggered a
regulatory response. Unlike their freely convertible counterparts,
alternative currencies operating (at least nominally) within closed
virtual systems remain unregulated. Semi-convertible alternative
currencies are becoming increasingly popular 209 in mobile and
computer games and also do not seem to attract regulatory attention
insofar as their use is limited to virtual communities. This is not to say
virtual economies cannot have a connection to the real one, as the
European Central Bank (“ECB”) helpfully reminds us in its paper:
Therefore, an illustration of a flower sent to someone else in a
social network or better equipment for a character which is needed
to reach higher levels in an online game are two examples of
virtual goods that are sold in virtual communities. However, in our
view, there should be a clear differentiation between goods that are
used only in the virtual environment and those which are used in
the real world (e.g. music files or electronic books). 210

The situation with regulatory treatment of freely convertible
alternative currencies is more complicated. Clear links to the real
economy and entry points to the formal payment system are a cause for
concern, which is reflected in various regulatory measures adopted
throughout the globe. These currencies are predominantly 211 not
207. The algorithm is adjusted to ensure that the mathematical problem that needs to be
solved as part of proof of work does not become trivial as the overall computational power of
the DLT network increases.
208. For example, Ripple is essentially centralized. See Bitmex Research, The Ripple
story, BITMEX, (Feb. 6 2018) https://blog.bitmex.com/the-ripple-story/ [https://perma.cc/S3J9QW7U].
209. See supra note 186.
210. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, n 6.
211. A notable exception is a sub-class of digital alternative currencies called
“stablecoins”: their value is linked to fiat money (e.g., Tether, Dai, Utility Settlement Coin) or
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backed by any real assets and total supply of them is typically limited,
which makes them inherently volatile, as has been demonstrated by the
very significant fluctuations in Bitcoin prices. 212 High risks and low
numbers of accepting merchants make their use as a store of value and
unit of account problematic. By warning end-users about underlying
risks 213 and restricting commercial banks from engaging in operations
with digital alternative currencies, regulators safeguard the formal
payment system against exogenous money supply and the resulting
implications for system stability. 214
The most popular regulatory reaction to digital alternative
currencies so far has been warnings and prohibitions on their use as
part of the formal payment system, as well as clarifications on their
legal status. 215 In contrast, some states have gone further, attempting to
subject digital alternative currencies to comprehensive domestic
regulation. 216
2. Digital Alternative Currencies and SOC
Although currencies used in computer games and Bitcoin are
unlikely to be confused with SOC due to insufficient links to official
currency, 217 the same is not always true for all digital alternative
currencies. Classification difficulties are possible when a digital
alternative currency is (i) issued and administered by a single entity
(i.e., not via a distributed ledger using consensus algorithms to verify
transactions, as is the case with Bitcoin) and (ii) convertible by the
issuer into official currency. In this scenario, similarities with SOC
would be striking. Neither enjoys the status of legal tender, and thus
other assets (such as bullion in the case of Digix). Despite apparent advantages, convertibility
of stablecoins is not guaranteed as a matter of law and is based entirely on the infrastructure
created by their developers. Insufficient (or non-existent) disclosure, oversight, and enforcement
mechanisms add to the underlying risks.
212. Although the price of a single Bitcoin did not exceed US$1 initially, December 2017
recorded an all-time high of nearly US$20,000. By the end of January 2018, Bitcoin fell sharply
to almost US$11,000. See Bitcoin Price, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/price/.
213. These include limited transparency, lack of continuity, high IT and network
dependency, as well as anonymity/pseudonymity. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra
note 12, at 20-23.
214. For examples of integration of digital alternative currencies in real life economy, see
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 16.
215. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 30-32.
216. See, e.g., Draft Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Digital Financial Assets,”
§ 4 (May 22, 2018), http://sozd.parliament.gov.ru/bill/419059-7 [https://perma.cc/RQ58-L4R6].
217. See supra Section IV.B.2.
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their usability depends on available infrastructure and arrangements
with the other members participating in the scheme (e.g., merchants).
Consequently, the underlying systemic risks are limited to the users of
the relevant scheme, meaning that the impact on the real economy is
directly proportional to the popularity of the relevant network among
end-users. 218 In the light of these similarities, both can be seen as
knock-offs of official currency. But if this is the case, why are only
SOC considered part of the formal payment system?
It appears that the key distinction should lie in how the currency
is sourced and supplied. Circulation of a digital currency that is issued
only in exchange for official currency of similar value has a neutral
effect on official currency and ensures seamless integration into the
formal payment system. This is a feature of SOC. In contrast, digital
alternative currencies that are convertible into official currency, but
have no similar checks on their supply, increase the number of currency
units in circulation thereby creating exogenous supply of official
currency. In other words, the supply of alternative currencies is
ultimately determined by developers of the corresponding technology,
rather than by the amount of official currency in circulation (with which
alternative currencies have no, or very limited, correlation).
Unfortunately, the nature of this distinction between SOC and
digital alternative currencies has not been given sufficient weight: early
attempts to differentiate between the two were based on regulatory
implications instead. For example, in 2012 the ECB adopted a
simplistic view that the key difference is that electronic money (a type
of SOC) is regulated and is expressed in the same units of account as
official currency. 219 This analysis could have remained purely
theoretical if it were not for a recent revision of the EU law.
Accidentally, however, the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”)
Directive, that came into force on July 9, 2018, 220 has provided an
excellent opportunity to examine and compare actual rules of law
governing electronic money and virtual currencies (a type of official
currency) within a single legal system. Let us now compare the relevant

218. As a result of these similarities, the two categories are sometimes used
interchangeably. See, e.g., BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 18, at 4.
219. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, at 16-17; EUROPEAN CENTRAL
BANK 2012, supra note 8, at 11 & Table “A money matrix.”
220. Directive 2018/843, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018,
2018 O.J. (L 156).
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definitions in the E-Money Directive and the Fifth AML Directive. The
former defines “electronic money” as follows:
“[E]lectronic money” means electronically, including
magnetically, stored monetary value as represented by a claim on
the issuer which is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of
making payment transactions . . . , and which is accepted by a
natural or legal person other than the electronic money issuer. 221

The key elements of this definition are: (i) a store of value, (ii)
electronic form, (iii) claim on the issuer, (iv) credit based on receipt of
funds, and (v) acceptance by third parties. In contrast, the Fifth AML
Directive clearly states that virtual currencies are a separate legal
category, which “should not . . . be confused with electronic money”222
and defines the new term as follows:
“[V]irtual currencies” means a digital representation of value that
is not issued or guaranteed by a central bank or a public authority,
is not necessarily attached to a legally established currency and
does not possess a legal status of currency or money, but is
accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of exchange and
which can be transferred, stored and traded electronically. 223

The new term was designed to be separate, but many of its
elements are similar to the “electronic money” definition. Just like in
the definition of “electronic money,” it refers to (i) a store (or
representation) of value, (ii) electronic form, and (iii) acceptance by
third parties. Just as easily a virtual currency can meet the two
remaining features of “electronic money,” namely issuance on receipt
of funds and being a claim on the issuer (this would be the case for
certain centralized digital alternative currencies). Additional elements
that are unique for the definition of “virtual currencies” not add much
to separate the two terms. First, electronic money does not have to be
(and is almost never) issued by a central bank or a public authority.
Second, it follows from the second definition that a virtual currency
attached to a “legally established currency” remains a possibility.
This leaves us with only one meaningful criterion to separate the
two concepts—“a legal status of currency or money”—being a test that
virtual currencies are not expected to meet. Unfortunately, it is not clear
what exactly gives a “legal” status to a currency. Presumably, the text
221. Directive 2009/110, 2009 O.J. (L 267), art. 2(2).
222. Directive 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156), Preamble ¶ 10.
223. Directive No. 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156), art. 1(2)(d).
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implies a status of official currency (which is usually the currency
issued by the state), as well as SOC (in EU terminology – electronic
money). If this assumption is correct, the test works by making it
impossible to meet the criteria of a “virtual currency” as long as all
criteria of “electronic money” are met (the latter precludes
characterization as virtual currency).
This highlights the residual nature of the category of “alternative
currencies.” In the example above, all other things being equal,
classification of a currency as “electronic money” and not “virtual
currency” can only result from the primacy of one category (“electronic
money”) over the other (“virtual currency”). This primacy is based on
the idea that the former has a certain “legal” status that the latter lacks
(even though the nature of this legal status is not adequately established
by the law).
VI. NEXT STEPS IN THE EVOLUTION OF OFFICIAL CURRENCY
A. Implications of the Formal Payment System
As recently as fifteen years ago, the fundamentals of a two-tier
payment system based on official currency issued by central banks and
commercial banks appeared axiomatic. A 2003 report by the Bank for
International Settlements summarized the joint position of the central
banks on its Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (“CPSS”)
as follows:
The CPSS central banks share the conviction that the composite of
central and commercial bank money, convertible at par, is
essential to the safety and efficiency of the financial system and
should remain the basis of the singleness of the currency. In other
words, central banks would accept neither an outcome in which
central bank money crowds out private initiative, nor an outcome
in which central bank money is phased out by a market
mechanism. Neither of these two outcomes is regarded as plausible
in the near future. 224

224. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 6-7.
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The future has now arrived, with the lessons (hopefully) learned
from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 and renewed warnings
about the shaky foundations of the current banking system. 225
Despite all its benefits, 226 the ultimate form of settlement—central
bank accounts—enjoys only limited use among non-banks, smaller
financial institutions and the public: cash is reserved for minor
transactions, while settlements via central bank accounts are usually
performed only by the largest banks. Everywhere else, commercial
banks provide the dominant form of digital official currency, which, in
legal terms, remains no more than a claim against the relevant financial
institution. Since a claim is only as good as the reputation and financial
standing of the party promising to honor it, this monopoly is built on
public trust regulators aim to reinforce (e.g., by way of deposit
insurance schemes), and if for whatever reason that trust is misplaced,
end-users of official currency have little choice (except hoarding cash
or investing in other assets).
The unavoidable result is that end-users essentially take on credit
risks vis-à-vis their banks every time, even when they do not intend to
extend credit (e.g., when earning a salary). 227 For the great majority of
end-users there is simply no way at present to use official currency
without such credit risk. Interestingly, while there are instruments
protecting banks against additional credit exposure, such as
subordinated loans eligible for capital inclusion, 228 there is no extra
protection for individual account holders (except deposit
insurance 229—which is inconvenient because of upper coverage limits
and the resulting need to spread one’s accounts across various financial
institutions to circumvent this restriction). For businesses, deposit
insurance is of even lesser use (or may not exist in the first place).
Finally, in the case of negative interest rates, this status quo seems
225. See Martin Wolf, Banking Remains Far Too Undercapitalised for Comfort,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 21 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/9dd43a1a-9d49-11e7-8cd4932067fbf946 (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
226. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
227. Even where deposit insurance exists, the credit risks persist above statutory limits. In
addition, recovery of funds following a bank collapse may take time and effort.
228. The criteria such loans must meet to qualify as capital often include restrictions on
early repayment, such as the need to obtain regulator’s approval. See, e.g., Bank of Russia,
Regulation No. 395-P of Dec. 28, 2012, on the methodology for Determining the Amount of
Own Funds (Capital) of Credit Institutions (Basel III), § 3.1.8.
229. See Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §1821 (1989); see also in Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 331-336, 124 Stat.
1376, 1540 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o).
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totally absurd: depositors are charged for taking on credit risk vis-à-vis
their bank.
B. Three Ways Forward for Official Currency
In her recent speech at the Bank of England, Christine Lagarde
cautiously pictured a future that may not be too distant: “If privately
issued virtual currencies remain risky and unstable, citizens may even
call on central banks to provide digital forms of legal tender.” 230
In this section we outline three possible approaches: (i) central
bank accounts with general access, (ii) central bank accounts with
intermediated access, and (iii) new digital forms of official currency.
1. Central Bank Accounts with Intermediated Access
The idea to provide safer options for storing value in the form of
official currency is not new. Back in 1987, Nobel Laureate James Tobin
suggested making available to the general public so-called “deposited
currency” to minimize reliance on deposit insurance schemes: “I think
the government should make available to the public a medium with the
convenience of deposits and the safety of currency, essentially currency
on deposit, transferable in any amount by check or other order.” 231 The
new type of currency, according to Tobin, could be provided by Federal
Reserve Banks themselves or by commercial banks, provided that the
funds so deposited are isolated from the rest of their own liabilities.232
At the time, direct central bank accounts appeared a somewhat distant
opportunity: even in the first scenario Tobin expected Federal Reserve
Banks to act via “conveniently located agencies in private banks or post
offices.” 233
Many of the more recent proposals similarly suggest an
intermediated approach, whereby central banks act through specially
authorized counterparties providing access to central bank accounts. In
a 2016 research paper, Dyson and Hodgson argue in favor of “Digital
Cash Accounts” held by private operators guaranteed by central
230. Christine Lagarde, Central Banking and Fintech – A Brave New World?,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/
2017/09/28/sp092917-central-banking-and-fintech-a-brave-new-world
[https://perma.cc/
EF3Y-BSR3] (emphasis added).
231. James Tobin, A Case for Preserving Regulatory Distinctions, 30 CHALLENGE 10, 13
(1987).
232. Id.
233. Id.
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banks. 234 These operators (labelled “DCA Providers”) would be
prohibited from lending or taking on any new risks on client funds.235
In addition, it is expected that a multiplicity of operators would create
competition and reduce the administrative burden on central banks.236
In a similar fashion, Ketterer and Andrade envisage (as one of the
possible alternatives) a model whereby private firms “would provide
all the transactional and costumer [sic] services related to CBM [central
bank money] accounts,” while maintaining a 100% reserve for each
deposit at all times. 237
Intermediation of central bank accounts can take various forms,
from new types of commercial bank accounts, to accounts with trusted
intermediaries fully guaranteed by the central bank. In each case,
however, users of the new currency should have direct recourse to
central bank accounts.
2. Central Bank Accounts with Direct Access
Needless to say, over the past thirty years, technology has
advanced way beyond Tobin’s cautious expectations: “Computer
capabilities should soon make it possible to withdraw conventional
currency at any office or agency, and even to order payments to third
parties by card or telephone.” 238 With this in mind, modern
commentators call for broader direct access to central bank accounts
for the general public and non-financial institutions. 239
234. Ben Dyson & Graham Hodgson, Digital Cash: Why Central Banks Should Start
Issuing Electronic Money, POSITIVE MONEY, (Jan. 2016), 2, http://positivemoney.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Digital_Cash_WebPrintReady_20160113.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
L5NV-VKAH].
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Juan Antonio Ketterer & Gabriela Andrade, Digital Central Bank Money and the
Unbundling of the Banking Function (Inter-American Development Bank discussion paper No
IDB-DP-449 2016), 7, https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/7587/DigitalCentral-Bank-Money-and-the-Unbundling-of-the-Banking-Function.pdf?sequence=1
[https://perma.cc/BJ7S-Y8C4].
238. Tobin, supra note 231, at 13.
239. See, e.g., Nicholas Gruen, Why Central Banks Should Offer Bank Accounts to
Everyone, EVONOMICS (Dec. 16 2016), http://evonomics.com/central-banks-for-everyonenicholas-gruen/ [https://perma.cc/87X8-FK67]; George Hatjoullis, Allow Deposit Accounts
With Central Banks, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 24 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/00f796cc9f99-11e7-8cd4-932067fbf946
[https://www.ft.com/content/00f796cc-9f99-11e7-8cd4932067fbf946]; JP Koning, Central Banks Deposits for You and Me, MONEYNESS (Aug. 10
2016), http://jpkoning.blogspot.com.au/2016/08/central-banks-deposits-for-you-and-me.html
[https://perma.cc/Y3AD-M95V]; Dyson & Hodgson, supra note 234.
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As discussed previously in Section IV.A, 240 the list of persons or
entities with direct access to central bank accounts is rather limited.
Expansion of this list to cover a wider user base is fraught with three
major difficulties: (i) it requires a greatly increased amount of
computing power and cybersecurity; (ii) more significantly, it requires
a massive amount of customer-facing infrastructure that central banks
today lack and are not configured to ever provide; and (iii) more
systemically, central bank accounts with direct access would compete
with other formal currency types and would likely undermine the
position of other currency operators (such as commercial banks) with
massively destabilizing consequences for the broader economy.
3. New Forms of Official Currency
Whereas the first two options are based on central bank accounts
and, consequently, can be seen as steps in the evolution of existing
currency types, the third option represents a major change – the
creation of a new type of official currency. This new currency is issued
by the state, but is not tied to central bank accounts and does not rely
on intermediaries. The first example of such official currency is the
Petro launched in Venezuela in February 2018. 241
At first glance, the Petro can be easily confused with alternative
currencies. First, it is issued in the form of a public offering (commonly
known as an “ICO”). 242 Second, its terms and technical characteristics
are listed in a “white paper”—the standard practice for issuing new
digital alternative currencies. 243 Third, it utilizes blockchain 244 for
secure recordkeeping and disintermediation. Despite these similarities,
the new currency cannot be characterized as an alternative currency due
to its distinct legal status. 245 The official white paper declares:
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela guarantees that it will
accept Petro’s as a form of payment of national taxes, fees,
240. See supra Section IV.A.
241. Kevin Helms, Venezuela Makes Petro Crypto a National Currency, Publishes New
Whitepaper, BITCOIN (Oct. 4, 2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/venezuela-petro-newwhitepaper/ [https://perma.cc/6R3M-V9H9].
242. For more detail on the operation of ICOs, see Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley,
Douglas W. Arner & Linus Föhr, The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, It’s a Bubble, It’s a Super
Challenge for Regulators, 63 HARV. INT’L L. J. (forthcoming 2019), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3072298 (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
243. Id. at 10-11.
244. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
245. Assuming the corresponding changes are adequately reflected in the law.
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contributions and public services, taking as a reference the price
of the barrel of the Venezuelan basket of the previous day with a
percentage discount. 246

The emphasis here is not on the connection with oil prices – after
all, there are a number of alternative currencies pegged to various
assets, and this is simply a price-setting mechanism. 247 Instead, the
focus should be on the mechanisms used by the state to promote
circulation of the new currency as a medium of exchange. A state’s
acceptance of a currency in payments to itself is a defining feature of
official currencies. 248 So upon the taxonomy proposed in this Article,
the Petro is a strange creature, it is an official currency offered not by
issuance by a national central bank in the usual way, but in an ICO, so
that presumably the supply of Petros is limited until another ICO issues
more into the market.
The Petro is likely to pave the way to new state-backed digital
official currencies, and one can already see the first signs of regulatory
changes reflecting the emergence of such new currencies. For example,
the new definitions introduced in the Fifth AML Directive discussed in
Section V.B.2 above 249 make it clear that an alternative digital currency
“issued or guaranteed by a central bank or a public authority” 250 is not
considered a virtual currency. What is it then if not a new sovereign
digital official currency?
C. New Opportunities and New Challenges
Evolutionary features of the new approaches to official currencies
stem from their prospective benefits. First, all three approaches listed
in Sections VI.B.1-VI.B.3 251 offer an opportunity to reduce the risks of
using official currency, either by completely eliminating any
intermediaries, or by making intermediation riskless (in the case of
intermediated central bank accounts discussed in Section VI.B.1
above). 252 Second, in either case the resulting medium of exchange
246. GOBIERNO BOLIVARIANO DE VENEZUELA, PETRO WHITE PAPER FINANCIAL
PROPOSAL 14 (2018), https://d158ejkbvy3pxw.cloudfront.net/wp-poricontent/uploads/2018/01/
Whitepaper_Petro_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6S9-E4LA] (emphasis added).
247. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
248. See Part III above; supra note 190 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 223 and accompanying text; supra Section V.B.2.
250. See supra text accompanying note 223.
251. See supra Sections VI.B.1-3.
252. See supra Section VI.B.1.
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enjoys the status of official currency – and consequently increases the
variety of payment instruments available to end-users. Third, the new
instruments are likely to implement some of the useful features of
alternative currencies. For example, the Petro uses blockchain
technology as an instrument for arranging transaction data into tamperproof chronologically-arranged data units – in hopes that algorithmbased transaction recording will promote end-user trust in the new
currency. 253 Blockchain’s enhanced record-keeping functionality can
be used to greatly enhance states’ capability to monitor the flow of
funds in the economy and resolve other technical problems. 254 It should
be noted, however, that these new technologies are likely to undergo a
number of transformations in the hands of the state before
implementation. Thus, in contrast to Bitcoin, which first implemented
blockchain as part of a public currency with a decentralized governance
system accessible by anyone with a computer, the “sovereign
blockchain” is likely to be built in a closed, private system controlled
by the state and with a strong governance layer provided by the state
that sits atop the blockchain and with power to amend it.255 Fourth,
increased circulation of new state-backed digital official currencies
would reduce circulation of cash and reduce the costs of replacing
deteriorating banknotes.
Despite the above opportunities, challenges will be many. First,
integration of a new currency having the benefit of state backing may
jeopardize the utility of bank accounts and SOC. States will have to
make important policy decisions to maintain a healthy balance within
the payment system: uncontrolled expansion of new state-backed
official currencies may lead to instant bank runs. One should note,
however, that regulators and legislators have a wide range of
instruments to address this potential problem: from purely economic
(such as negative interest rates for central bank accounts to discourage
mass withdrawals from commercial bank deposits) to administrative
(such as limitations on the amount of new currency owned by each
person or increasing the coverage limits of deposit insurance). Second,
the recent revisions to the Fifth AML Directive, which provides for

253. PETRO, supra note 246, at 8 & 12.
254. One such problem is controlling the prohibition of lending SOC balances. See supra
Section IV.B.
255. This is true in the case of the Fedcoin proposal. See Koning, supra note 6, at 23.

1092 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:4

additional AML checks for virtual currencies, 256 indicate that states are
unlikely to permit anonymous circulation of new units of digital
currency. As a result, additional identification and know-yourcustomer mechanisms will have to be implemented, at additional costs.
Third, benefits of the new official currencies for end-users, particularly
individuals, may be questionable. On the one hand, those who prefer
anonymized transactions are unlikely to appreciate the complete
visibility of payment transactions monitored by the state. On the other
hand, governments may offer tangible benefits to support the new
projects, such as simplified conversion of new digital official
currencies into official currency of other states based on arrangements
with other states implementing similar initiatives. 257 Fourth, legal
systems will need to be adjusted to formalize the legal status of the
relevant currencies as a medium of exchange accepted as official
currency. 258
However, one of the biggest possible challenges stems from the
herding effect that may result from the adoption of a disintermediated
state-backed official currency by a major economy, like the United
States. The utility of an official medium of exchange digitally available
to end-users without any intermediaries is hard to overestimate – such
a currency could quickly become a dominant medium of exchange in
international transactions, without meaningful ways for other states to
regulate it, since the underlying technology easily penetrates national
boundaries. One possible response for other states in this scenario could
be the development of their own competing sovereign digital
currencies and their promotion for internal use. This could explain, at
least in part, why so many national regulators have expressed interest
in devising a new sovereign currency. 259 Few nations appear keen to
256. See Directive 2018/843 (amending Directives (EU) 2015/849, 2009/138/EC, and
2013/36/EU), 2018 O.J. (L 156), art. 1(1)(c).
257. According to the World Bank, international transfer costs remain significant. See
Remittance Prices Worldwide, THE WORLD BANK (Dec. 2015), https://remittanceprices.
worldbank.org/sites/default/files/rpw_report_december_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L7R6Z6K5].
258. This list is not meant to be exhaustive and merely outlines some of the immediate
concerns identified by the Authors.
259. For an example in Canada, see Walter Engert & Ben S.C. Fung, Central Bank Digital
Currency: Motivations and Implications (Bank of Canada Staff Discussion Paper 2017-16,
2017),
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/sdp2017-16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JZ27-7BLV]. For China, see Will Knight, China’s Central Bank has begun
Cautiously Testing a Digital Currency, MIT TECH. REV. (June 23, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608088/chinas-central-bank-has-begun-cautiously-
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take the leap into the unknown involved in issuing a sovereign digital
currency. However, many nations recognize that should a credible
major country issue a sovereign digital currency, it may offer
considerable advantages over regular currency in the first-mentioned
nation’s jurisdiction, and so the nation could rapidly face the loss of
both monetary sovereignty and of the data associated with the use of
the sovereign digital currency which will be collected by the issuing
sovereign abroad, not the nation within which it is being used. Only
time will tell the answer, but for now one question remains: which
country will be the first to throw down the gauntlet in the sovereign
digital currency battle? 260
VII. CONCLUSION
The currency taxonomy proposed in this Article, which is based
on separating formal and alternative payment systems, offers two main
advantages: consistency and flexibility. The focus on just one function
of money (medium of exchange) ensures that elements of taxonomy
are comparable and eliminates characterization issues (such as whether
a state’s national currency is not stable enough to perform the store of
value function necessary for classification as “money”). Flexibility
stems from the functional approach, which makes it possible to
flawlessly integrate new state-backed digital currencies, which are
testing-a-digital-currency/ [https://perma.cc/ERB2-EG9L]. For India, see Eugenia Kovalovia,
India wants to issue Bitcion-like Cryptocurrency backed by Central Bank, COINSPEAKER (Sept.
18,
2017),
https://www.coinspeaker.com/2017/09/18/india-wants-issue-bitcoin-likecryptocurrency-backed-central-bank/ [https://perma.cc/4653-DSRQ]. For Israel, see Omri
Milman & Amarelle Wenkert, Israel considers issuing an official state currency, CTECH (Dec.
24,
2017),
https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3728018,00.html
[https://perma.cc/UX34-E76K]. For Russia, see Arseniy Sheltsin, Exclusive: the cryptor will be
released in mid-2019, HI-TECH (Jan. 15, 2018), https://hi-tech.mail.ru/news/ehksklyuzivkriptorubl-budet-vypushchen-v-seredine-2019-goda/?frommail=1#a01 [https://perma.cc/6JFN9G4Q]. For Singapore, see SOPNENDU MOHANTY & NG NAM SIN, PROJECT UBIN: SGD ON
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER (2017). For Sweden, see Sveriges Riksbank, E-krona, RIKSBANK (May.
05,
2018),
https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/financial-stability/payments/e-krona/
[https://perma.cc/BV89-XY6P]. For the UK, see Victoria Cleland, Digital future for sterling:
assessing
the
implications,
BANK
OF
ENGLAND
(July
05,
2017),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/article/2017/digital-future-for-sterlingassessing-the-implications-article-by-victoria-cleland.pdf?la=en&hash=8036AC7641A4E1
ADC0227CDA7DC3B00F04D81E88 [https://perma.cc/6JPM-4JRY].
260. Venezuela’s example is not indicative due to the current state of its economy and the
US sanctions. See Patrick Gillespie, Venezuela tries a cryptocurrency to solve its economic
crisis, CNN MONEY, (Feb. 20, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/20/news/economy/
venezuela-petro/index.html [https://perma.cc/GES3-2MPH].
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likely to have a major impact on how payment systems operate – either
by allowing broader access to central bank accounts (whether directly
or indirectly), or by implementing entirely new, bespoke media of
exchange.
Our analysis of the formal payment system shows that payment
instruments that were designed to be tightly connected to official
currency should be classified as part of the formal payment system.
Although they possess sufficient distinguishing features not to be
assimilated with official currencies, their association with the latter
(including the neutral effect on the supply of official currency) justify
their classification as surrogates.
The taxonomy in this Article highlights important classification
problems. First, in some situations (e.g., when an alternative currency
has a single issuer and is pegged to official currency), SOCs and
alternative currencies may be so similar functionally, that any
difference in classification has to be based on regulatory treatment
alone. Second, the use of convertibility as a classification criterion for
alternative currencies is fraught with practical difficulties, since, even
where conversion may be officially prohibited, it is frequently arranged
by other, indirect, means – provided there is sufficient demand.
This Article suggests three different ways forward for the
evolution of official currencies. Major economies are very highly
unlikely to structure their own state-backed digital currencies along the
lines of Venezuela’s newly issued sovereign digital currency (the
Petro). However, the launch of the Petro has heralded the entry of
governments onto the digital currency stage in a process that will most
likely continue so that digital alternative currencies like Bitcoin are
going to face increased competition. Furthermore, we explain that the
launch of additional state-backed digital currencies – particularly by
major economies – is likely to have a strong flow-on effect, resulting
in the proliferation of similar currencies across the globe. This future is
very real and may be very near.
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